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AIDS VACCINE MANUFACTURERS V. TORT REGIME:
THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES
Vaccines have contributed more to public health in this country and
around the world than any other medical product, device, or pro-
cedure.I
Vaccines have effectively controlled or eradicated the once fatal and
debilitating diseases of smallpox, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, measles,
mumps, rubella, and polio. 2 Yet, the imposition of strict product liability
for adverse side-effects suffered by some vaccine users substantially deterred
the development and manufacture of these vaccines and continues to hinder
future access to them.3 In the 1970s and early 1980s, twelve of the sixteen
1. Peter Huber, Will New Vaccine Statute Give Shot in Arm to Tort Reform?, LEGAL
Tndms, Mar. 9, 1987, at 9 (referring to importance of vaccines in combatting nationwide
diseases and noting deterrent effect of tort liability). See generally Sharon Snider, Childhood
Vaccines, FDA CONSUmR, Sept. 1990, at 19-26 (presenting historic overview of each childhood
disease and vaccine).
2. See, e.g., EvE K. NICHOLS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MOBnU.iziG AGAINST
AIDS 223-24 (1989) [hereinafter MoBuzn.n AGAINsT AIDS] (noting that immunization by
antiviral vaccines has controlled familiar diseases of measles, mumps and rubella); Victoria
Bennett, Health Law-Vaccine Injuries-Federal Law Prescribes for Alternatives to Tort
Actions for Vaccine-related Injuries, 11 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 749, 749 (1988-89) (noting
that National Childhood Vaccination Programs' goal of reducing morbidity and mortality
accompanying childhood diseases was successful); Gordon Ada, Prospects for a Vaccine Against
HIV, 339 NATURE 331, 331 (1989) (noting that vaccines have controlled prior epidemics and
that health officials can use vaccines to control current AIDS epidemic). Many vaccines
designed to prevent or control viral infections are highly successful. Id. The use of vaccines
against measles, mumps, rubella and polio viruses has reduced these diseases to minor public-
health problems. Id. Vaccines are widely employed as public health measures in the United
States and other industrialized countries and have had an enormous impact on morbidity and
mortality. INsTrTrUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY & INNOVATION 18-19 (1985) [hereinafter
VSI]; see also Snider, supra note 1, at 19-26 (describing effectiveness of vaccination programs
in controlling childhood diseases and supporting finding with relevant infection statistics). For
a list of the major achievements, including decreases in death and infection rates see id. at
18-19; Snider, supra note 1, at 19-26.
Cf. CAROLYN H. ASBURY, ORPHANr DRUGS 65 (1985) (noting that federal government
played large role in development and distribution of vaccines for typhoid fever, cholera,
anthrax, rabies, mumps, measles, rubella, and, most recently, hepatitis B, pneumococcal
pneumonia and meningococcal infections).
3. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 2, at 749 (stating that, during childhood disease crisis,
litigation expenses and increasing liability insurance premiums drove vaccine manufacturers
from the marketplace and forced those remaining to increase prices); Charles F. Hagan,
Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J., 477, 477-79 (1990) (noting that
threat of product liability lawsuits inhibited manufacturers of swine flu and childhood vaccines
and that liability associated with vaccine-related injuries has marked effect of decreasing
number of commercial manufacturers in business of vaccine development); VSI, supra note 2,
at 15 (citing in-depth governmental study of tort liability's effect on vaccine production and
availability). Withdrawals from the market due to vaccine-related injury liability concerns
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American vaccine manufacturers simply dropped out of the market, seriously
threatening vaccine supply.4 In response, Congress enacted legislation to
address the detrimental effect the tort liability system was having on vaccine
innovation and access. 5 In order to avoid repeating history, we must learn
from these past vaccine scenarios and attempt to structure an effective
method to deal with the problems conventional tort liability places in the
path of finding an answer to the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) epidemic.
6
create a situation in which the United States is almost totally reliant on one manufacturer for
polio and DPT vaccines (Lenderle), and on another for measles, mumps, and rubella vaccines
(Merck, Sharp & Dohme). Id. Only one, or at most two, distributors supply each of the major
pediatric vaccines, and even these situations are unstable. Id. Manufacturers state that decisions
to discontinue are made because of extreme liability exposure, the high cost of litigation, and
the difficulty of obtaining adequate insurance. Id. at 27. In addition to causing vaccine
withdrawal from the market, imposition of tort liability has created a disincentive to investment
in the development of new or improved immunizing agents. Id. at 15.
After an in-depth study of vaccine availability barriers and impediments through history,
the Committee on Public-Private Sector Relations in Vaccine Innovation (on behalf of the
Institute of Medicine) made several conclusions. Id. at 11. First, over the past two decades,
pharmaceutical companies have been withdrawing from vaccine manufacturing and marketing
areas in general. Id. Second, this withdrawal is primarily a result of manufacturers' concerns
about litigation costs or difficulty in obtaining insurance coverage. Id. Third, these concerns
of present or anticipated vaccine-related injury liability expenses are seen as an unreasonable
burden in relation to the costs of product development and the income from sales. Id. at 11;
see infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text (detailing Committee's findings and recommen-
dations).
4. Snider, supra note 1, at 23.
5. See Hagan, supra note 3 (providing summary of federal and state vaccine compen-
sation schemes). Manufacturers were immunized from small pox vaccination side-effects by
the Vaccine Act of 1913 (repealed in 1922). VSI, supra note 2, at 15. In response to the wave
of lawsuits surrounding the swine flu vaccine, Congress enacted P.L. 94-380 and assumed all
liability on the behalf of the vaccine manufacturers. Bennett, supra note 2, at 750. The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 partially immunized manufac-
turers and created a system of no-fault compensation for persons suffering from vaccine-
related injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -33 (Supp. 1986).
6. See AIDS AND nmi LAW 26 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter AIDS
AND THm LAW] (suggesting that if AIDS vaccination reaches universal stage we would be faced
afresh with all problems and issues which made swine flu immunization campaign of 1976 so
difficult for public and for health officials); Richard Cooper, For AIDS Innoculants, Ounce
of Pre-emption Worth a Pound of Cure, LEGAL TImts, June 6, 1989, at 18 (acknowledging
that researchers have made significant progress in overcoming some obstacles to useful vaccine,
and so it is not too early to consider issues of products liability that will arise when and if
vaccine becomes ready for mass use). Cooper, an AIDS commentator, analogizes the past
vaccine scenarios with potential AIDS vaccines. Id. He notes that no vaccine can be perfect;
it is reasonable to assume that an AIDS vaccine, like other vaccines, will produce some serious
adverse effects in at least a statistically small number of vaccines. Id. The common-law rules
of liability and the practical operation of the tort litigation system give manufacturers of
vaccines even greater cause for concern than physicians treating patients or scientists conducting
human research. Id. There is reason to expect that if an effective and safe vaccine were
developed no manufacturer would market the vaccine until changes were made in the rules
governing liability for injuries caused by the vaccine. Id. The precedent illustrating both the
problem and a possible solution is swine flu. Id. After an outbreak of swine flu in the winter
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AIDS is deemed the worst infectious disease in history.7 The human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), responsible for transmitting AIDS, strikes
all sectors of society, regardless of racial, economic, sexual, and age
boundaries. 8 Fortunately, private industry has the ability to formulate,
produce, and test an AIDS vaccine. 9 As of 1990, the National Institute of
Allergic and Infectious Diseases reported at least thirty vaccines under
development world-wide,' 0 seven of which have already.reached the human
testing stage." However, if the tort liability problems persist, these potential
of 1976, the federal government moved quickly to prevent an epidemic anticipated to begin
the following fall. Id. At the urging of President Ford, Congress appropriated $135 million
to purchase the vaccine. Id. Vaccine manufacturers built up an inventory to 100 million doses
but refused to release the doses when their insurance carriers declined to extend coverage to
the vaccine. Id. To resolve the deadlock, Congress enacted P.L. 94-380. Id. Under this statute,
the United States government assumed all liability on behalf of the vaccine manufacturers, the
administrators of the immunization program, and the healthcare providers who would admin-
istrator the shots. Id. Thus, the federal government assumed the burden of strict liability under
state law and the burden of litigating unmeritorius claims. Id.
7. See, e.g., H.R. Rm,. No. 511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 693 (1990) (testimony of Stanley
K. Monteith, M.D.) (stating that "[t]he insidious spread of AIDS has been likened to the
Black Death of the 14th century."); Thomas J. Matthews & Dani P. Bolognesi, AIDS Vaccines,
Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 120 (noting that prominent researchers remark that unless researchers
develop effective vaccine, "this [past] decade in the shadow of AIDS will have been just a
foretaste of the virus' ultimate impact on public health, behavior and the economy across the
globe." ); Anthony S. Fauci, AIDS-Challenges to Basic and Clinical Biomedical Research,
AcAD. MED., Mar. 1989, at 115 (stating that scientists, physicians, and citizens of this nation
have faced crises before, but in many ways AIDS is different and more complex); Frank M.
Eldridge, Formulating AIDS Policy, 9 J. LEoAL MED. 519, 527 (1988) (stating that "[a]ll
humanity will be effected by AIDS in some way."); Great Expectations: Is the U.S. Doing
Its Best to Beat AIDS?, 23 FDA CONSUMER 36, 36 (1989) (noting that public fear surrounding
polio in 1950s, at one point killing 55,000 a year, and tuberculosis, at one point killing 400,000
a year, is "pale compared with current public fear of AIDS."). Scientifically, the problems
posed by AIDS are extraordinarily complicated, as is the nature of the virus that causes the
disease. Fauci, supra at 118. AIDS is a fatal infectious disease for which there is no cure; it
afflicts predominantly young, previously healthy persons in the prime of their lives. Id.
8. Michael Quam & Nancy Ford, AIDS Policies and Practices in the United States, in
ACTION o N AIDS 25-28 (Barbara A. Misztal & David Moss eds., 1990). See The HIV Challenge
Continues, HIV/AIDS PaEVNTION NEWSL. (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga.), Feb.
1991, at 1-3 [hereinafter PREVENTION NawsiLaTR] (giving detailed statistical distribution of
AIDS according to age, race, sex, and sexual orientation); DIVISION OF HIV/AIDS, CENTER
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SuRvEILLAN E (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga.),
Aug. 1991, at 8-12 [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SuRvmLANcE] (same); see also Geoffrey Cowley,
AIDS: The Next Ten Years, NawswvEaK, June 1990, at 20 (noting poor are not only ones
suffering from HIV infection); Charles Hite, AIDS in Women, RoANOKE Tsais & WORLD
NEWS, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al (noting women account for nearly 10% of AIDS cases and numbers
have increased steadily over past five years).
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SsA-ri CODE § 199.45(d) (West 1990) (stating that industry has
capability of conducting vaccine research, biological research, immunology, and genetic engi-
neering of appropriate viral components needed to formulate, develop, produce and test AIDS
vaccine); see also infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (detailing current stage of AIDS
vaccine research).
10. AIDS INFORMATION SotrcaBOOK 26 (H. Robert Malinowsky & Gerald J. Perry, eds.
3d ed. 1991).
11. 88 Medicines in Testing; 3 Approved in Past 12 Months, Bringing Total to 14, IN
1992]
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AIDS vaccines may never reach the market. Federal legislation is the
necessary solution to the detrimental effect that imposition of traditional
tort liability has on the development, marketing, and price of an AIDS
vaccine. 12
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The term "AIDS" designates the specific group of diseases and con-
ditions that are indicative of the severe immunosuppression resulting from
infection with HIV.' 3 By August 1991 the total number of AIDS cases in
the United States reached 186,895.'4 Some 1,500,000 United States citizens
are infected with the HIV virus, and estimates predict that 365,000 Amer-
icans will develop AIDS by the end of 1992.15 The world-wide picture is
dimmer yet, with approximately eight to ten million people infected. 6 The
most distressing statistic is the high mortality rate. 7 The average. AIDS
patient lives only eighteen months after diagnosis, and more than eighty-
five percent die within three years. 8 AIDS is now the leading cause of death
in New York City among young to middle-age men and women.' 9 Currently
there is no known cure for AIDS, and all scientific evidence indicates that
individuals testing positive for the virus will eventually contract AIDS and
die.20 The above statistics indicate that AIDS is a frightening contagion that
will challenge our medical, scientific, and legal communities for years to
DEVELOPMENT AIDS MEDICINES DRUGS AND VACCINES (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1991, at I [hereinafter 88 Medicines]. Researchers are currently
testing vaccines for effectiveness and safety in HIV negative, HIV positive, and AIDS-infected
individuals. Id. at 7.
12. See infra p. 24 (proposing federal compensation and immunization scheme for AIDS
vaccines).
13. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANcE, supra note 8, at 1 (providing governmental definition of
AIDS). For the medical description and definition of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and
the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, see MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 2, at
112-43.
14. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 8, at 5. Agency studies of AIDS reporting
statistics suggest at least 90% reporting accuracy for infection rate numbers. PUBLIC HE.LTH
SERVICE, HEALTH UNIrED STATES 1990, at 231 (1990).
15. AIDS Aim TE COURTS at xvii (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990)
(summarizing proceedings of 1989 five-day conference sponsored by State Justice Institute and
National Institute of Justice, attended by over 250 state court judges, lawyers, doctors,
professionals, government officials, and community representatives).
16. PREVENTION NEWSLETTER, supra note 8, at 1. The AIDS virus infects one-third of
the population in parts of Africa. Cowley, supra note 8, at 20.
17. See QuAm & FORD, supra note 8, at 25 (noting that AIDS mortality rate is alarmingly
high). AIDS mortality rates are extremely high, at approximately 90% for those diagnosed in
1983 or earlier. Id. The mortality rate in those diagnosed before 1985 is slightly lower-at
more than 80%. Cooper, supra note 6, at 18. Experts have predicted approximately 365,000
AIDS cases and 263,000 AIDS-related deaths by 1992. QUAm & FORD, supra note 8, at 25
(citation omitted).
18. Maragaret S. Rivas, The California AIDS Initiative and the Food and Drug Admin-
istration: Working at Odds with Each Other?, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 107, 108 (1991).
19. QUAM & FORD, supra note 8, at 25.
20. AIDS AND THE CouTs, supra note 15, at xii.
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come. 2' Not surprisingly, health officials have propelled AIDS to the top
of biomedical and public health agendas.'
II. VACCINATION AS THE PREFERABLE MEDICAL APPROACH
Practitioners can use various medical approaches, including drug therapy
and vaccination, to combat AIDS.u In 1991 the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association identified fourteen approved drugs, as well as eighty-
eight drugs and vaccines in development for AIDS and AIDS-related con-
ditions. The major goal of existing drug therapies is to increase the quantity
21. THE MEANING OF AIDS: IMPLCATIONS FOR MEDICAL SCIENCE, CLINICAL PRACTICE,
AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 163 (Eric Juengst & Barbara A. Koenig eds., 1989) [hereinafter
THE MEANING OF AIDS]. Projections for AIDS cases in the United States population are:
Worst case scenario-15 million infected by 2002 and 2.8 million deaths; baseline scenario-6
million infected by 2002 and 1.5 million deaths; best case scenario-l.5 million infected and
1.0 million deaths. WILLIAM B. JomsTON & KE viN R. HOPKINs, Tim CATASTROPHE AHEAD
138, 142 (1990).
22. QuAM & FORD, supra note 8, at 25. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45(e)
(West 1990) (noting that "[i]t is of the highest importance and in the public interest to
maximize public protection by developing an AIDS vaccine."); AIDS AND THE COURTS, supra
note 15, at xi (stating that "AIDS is now the number-one public health priority in nation,
and will continue to be so for years to come."); see also Tim MEANING OF AIDS, supra note
21, at 163 (acknowledging that AIDS "has generated an intense wave of vexing ethical, legal
and public policy questions many of which permit no simple solutions, and evidence suggests
that it will continue to do so for years to come.").
Federal expenditures indicate the level of importance the AIDS epidemic has reached
within the government. AIDS AND Tma COURTS, supra note 15, at xiv. Fiscal funding for 1982
to 1988 was over $1.5 billion, and the federal government spent $2.8 billion in 1990 alone.
Id. at xiii-xiv. Federal spending for AIDS research and treatment has climbed to $1.6 billion
in just nine years. Cowley, supra note 8, at 20.
23. See 88 Medicines, supra note 11, at 2-7 (listing and giving research stage of all
treatment options, including antivirals, cytokines, immunomodulators, anti-infectives, and
vaccines). The pressure to develop and evaluate experimental drugs to treat HIV infection
continues to mount. Fauci, supra note 7, at 115. There continues to exist a sense of urgency
to see the discovery, testing, and wide-scale availability of safe and effective drugs to fight
HIV infection and AIDS. Id.
24. 88 Medicines, supra note 11, at I. A "drug" is a product used for curing, preventing,
or treating the effects of a disease. ABA AIDS COORDINATINo Comm., AIDS: Tim LEGAL
ISSUES DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AIDS COORDINATING COMMnTTEE
135 (1988) [hereinafter ABA AIDS COORDINATING Comm.] (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1972).
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has given full marketing approval to azidothymidine
(AZT), ganciclovir, pentamidine, trimetrexate, and dideoxyinosine (DDI). See Marilyn Chase,
Distribution Drill: Bristol-Myers Guides a New AIDS Drug in Marketing Minefield, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 10, 1991, at Al (noting FDA approval of DDI); Gina Kolata, F.D.A. Gives Quick
Approval to Two Drugs to Treat AIDS, N.Y. TIsS, June 27, 1989, at Al (noting FDA
approval of AZT, ganciclovir, pentamidine and tremetrexate). The first approved drug, AZT,
was authorized for investigational treatment use in September 1986 and approved for application
to the critically ill in 1987. JoHNsToN & HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 111. AZT operates to
prevent infection of healthy cells by interfering with the HIV replication process, thereby
slowing the progression of the disease. Id. Yet AZT's severe toxicity has stopped many patients
from taking the drug. Id. at 112. Thus, scientists and patients recognize that AZT, while
somewhat successful, is not the final answer for the AIDS epidemic. MOBIm AGAINST
19921
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and quality of life: in other words, to delay mortality and to reduce
morbidity. 2 While prolonging life and easing pain are important, a preven-
tive or curative approach is clearly preferable and, thus, development of an
AIDS vaccine is a highly desirable goal.
26
A "vaccine" is a biological agent derived from a living organism, as
compared to chemically derived drugs, used for human immunization against
a virus.27 Because a vaccine prepares the body to kill or block the functioning
of the HIV, vaccination prevents the tearing down of the body's immune
system in the first instance.? Thus, the major goal of an AIDS vaccine is
AIDS, supra note 2, at 190. In 1989 the FDA announced that it would allow wider availability
of the experimental aerosol drug, pentamidine, which helps prevent a life-threatening pneumonia
often attacking AIDS victims. Rivas, supra note 18, at 108. Early testing indicates that the
most recently approved AIDS drug, DDI, slows the multiplication of the virus in the body.
Philip J. Hilt, F.D.A., in Big Shift, Will Permit Use of Experimental AIDS Drug, TnmES,
Sept. 19, 1991, at Al; see Chase, supra, at Al (noting DDI's introduction by Bristol-Squibb).
Unfortunately, DDI has severe side-effects, including inflammation of the pancreas and some
nerve damage, and its high death rate in the initial give-away program has been publicized.
Id.
25. Douglas D. Richman, Public Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Raises
Yet Another Conflict Between Freedom of the Individual and Welfare of the Individual and
Public, 159 J. INFrcnous DISEASES 412, 413 (1989). See JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 21,
at 115 (explaining that current AIDS drugs neither prevent infection nor cure it but only act
to slow down progression of disease). Several problems exist with therapeutic drugs that prevent
these drugs from solving the AIDS crisis, regardless of the promise that AZT or other therapies
have indicated. For instance, these drugs can neither prevent infection nor cure it. Id.
Therapeutic drugs act only to slow down the speed with which infected persons progress to
AIDS or die. Id. Ganciclovir, pentamidine, and trimetrexate treat the opportunistic disease,
not the HIV infection itself. Kolata, supra note 24, at Al. Only two drugs, DDI and AZT,
work directly against the AIDS virus; the rest simply treat the numerous opportunistic diseases
and conditions indicative of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome. 88 Medicines, supra
note 11, at 1. Yet both AZT and DDI have serious side-effects that make the drugs very
unpromising solutions. Chase, supra note 24, at Al. For an in-depth explanation of the
inadequacies of drug therapies in treating AIDS, see JONSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 21, at
115-18; Lawrence K. Altman, Experts on AIDS, Citing New Data, Push for Testing, N.Y.
Tmrms, Apr. 24, 1989, at Al. Both authors explain that the new drug approaches are not cures
for fatal disease, but are expected to add months of extra life for those people infected.
JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra at 115-18; Altman, supra note 21, at Al.
26. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §199.45(b) (West 1990) (stating that "[t]he best
hope of stemming the spread of the AIDS virus among the general public is the development
of an AIDS vaccine to develop an immunity to exposure."); JoHNsoN & HOPKINS, supra note
21, at 118 (arguing that vaccines represent highest hopes of AIDS researchers). A vaccine
would not necessarily prevent the infection from taking place, but with effective vaccination,
antibodies against HIV would successfully prevent the virus from establishing itself in the
body. Id. Commentators note that while the prospect of injecting healthy people with the
living virus is understandably frightening, live-attenuated vaccines have previously proved the
most effective means of establishing immunity. Shannon Brownlee, Plotting a Fresh Attack in
the War on AIDS, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 30, 1992, at 62.
27. See ABA AIDS COORDINATING CoMm., supra note 24, at 135 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
231(g)(1)).
28. See id. (noting advantages of vaccine). Unlike current drug therapies, which seek to
control the virus once it has already invaded the body and become entrenched in thousands
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to block the progression of the HIV infection into AIDS. 29 An effective
vaccine will virtually eliminate the risk of contracting AIDS, just as general
vaccination has eliminated the risk of contracting polio and smallpox. 0 In
fact, developing AIDS vaccines "hold the potential of rendering HIV
infection no more a worry to most people than polio is today."' 3'
Public support of vaccine development has been overwhelming, pro-
ducing a vehement push for faster research and results. 32 There has been
notable progress toward development of an AIDS vaccine. 33 Human testing
of experimental AIDS vaccines began in 1987, 34 and by 1991 the Food and
of cells, an effective vaccine would stop the virus before it could penetrate the human immune
system. JomsrON & HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 118; see also VSI, supra note 2, at v
(explaining that vaccines are elegant solution to infectious disease because body's own protective
mechanisms are primed by specific interventions to thwart invasion or multiplication of
pathogen). The immunization process is one of. the "genuinely decisive technologies of modern
medicine-it is effective, relatively inexpensive, relatively simple, and relatively easy to deliver.
Id.
29. JOHNSTON AND HOPKINs, supra note 21, at 118; see supra note 28 and accompanying
text (explaining advantage of vaccination over drug therapy).
30. CAL. HEALTH & SArFEY CODE § 199.45(c) (West 1990).
31. JomNSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 121.
32. See GEORGE GALuP, JR., THE GALLup POLL 104, 209, 230, 263 (1989). Public support
for continued AIDS research efforts is evidenced by recent polls. Id. The 1989 and 1990
Gallup Poll found the following answers to survey questions: 1) Likely that scientists will
develop vaccine for AIDS in next tens years? 72% Yes; 2) Should federal budget for AIDS
research be increased? 1989-52%, 1990-59% Yes; 3) The government is not doing enough
about the problem of AIDS? 53% agree. Id.
33. See JONsToN & HoPKINs, supra note 21, at 119-27 (explaining numerous researchers'
progress and noting that after three years of research, scientists working on possible AIDS
vaccine concepts have compiled more data on AIDS than during entire forty years in which
they have been studying polio); AIDS INrORMATON SoURcEaooK, supra note 10, at 20 (noting
that Dr. Salk, prominent AIDS vaccine researcher and developer of polio vaccine, who reports
great progress AIDS vaccine); Anthony S. Fauci, Development and Evaluation of a Vaccine
for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 373, 373-
84 (1989) [hereinafter Development of Vaccine] (explaining early obstacles to development of
AIDS vaccine and evaluating existing attempts to formulate vaccine); Ada, supra note 2, at
331, 339 (re-evaiuating prospects of AIDS vaccine after initial optimism and concluding that
there existed encouraging findings for effective vaccine based on gpl60-a surface antigen of
HIV virus). But see JOHN LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACTS 148-52 (1988) (explaining several
formidable obstacles for vaccine development and noting that even if this bleak outlook is
overcome, vaccine will not be available for some time to come); MoBILzING AGAINST AIDS,
supra note 2, at 234 (surveying problems in vaccine development and emphasizing trial vaccine's
failure to effect immunization in chimpanzees). One author points out that scientists and
reporters have not made it very clear that current human trials, those up to 1989, are safety
trials and do not themselves signal the advent of an effective vaccine. Id. at 227. Nevertheless,
the first experimental AIDS vaccines will soon be ready for large-scale human testing for
effectiveness, and currently health officials are planning vaccine trials in several developing
countries. Susan Okie, A Hitch in AIDS Vaccine Trials?: Research is Complicated by Differing
Strains of HIV Virus, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1991, (Health), at Z14. It will take three to five
years after the first vaccine shows any effect before a vaccine is made that can protect 80 to
90% of the population. Id.
34. AIDS AND THE COURTS, supra note 15, at xii. For a chronology of scientific events
19921
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Drug Administration (FDA) had granted permission for clinical testing to
a total of seven experimental vaccines.3" Nevertheless, as scientific capabilities
advance,36 legal complexities continue to stand in the way of an end to the
AIDS epidemic.
3 7
III. TRADToNAL TORT THEORY HINDERS THE DEVELOPMENT
oF AN AIDS VACCINE
The imposition of tort liability for pharmaceutical drug and vaccine
side-effects hinders development of an AIDS vaccine.3" An AIDS vaccine is
in AIDS research, see AIDS INFORMATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 3-29. For a detailed
discussion of specific results of experimental trials and new developments in vaccine research,
see JOINSTON AND HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 118-127; LANGONE, supra note 33, at 188-202.
35. 88 Medicines, supra note 11, at I. See AIDS INFORMATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note
34, at 3-29 (giving chronology of scientific events in AIDS treatment research). Danial Zagury
conducted the first human trial of an AIDS vaccine at the Peirre and Marie Curie University
in Paris. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 2, at 227. Zagury demonstrated that vaccine
gpl60 recombinant virus could induce both antibody-mediated and cell-mediated immunity
against HIV. Id. The vaccine did not produce any side-effects beyond localized soreness
normally associated with a good immune response. Id. These trials do not provide any evidence
about vaccine efficacy in humans but simply answer questions about safety and preliminary
information. Id. Researchers at National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID)
also have had successful responses with no adverse side-effects in early human trials. JOHNSTON
& HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 120.
36. See AIDS AND THE COURTS, supra note 15, at xiv (remarking that more scientific
advances were made in less time for AIDS than for any other complex disease in history of
medicine); Development of Vaccine, supra note 33, at 373 (remarking that level of scientific
advancement and speed with which AIDS research were achieved was extraordinary); supra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text (detailing scientific research on AIDS drugs and vaccines).
37. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45(h) (West 1990) (noting utilization
of this new vaccination approach to the AIDS epidemic may be forestalled by problems that
have recently deterred development of vaccines); AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 26
(arguing that if sound vaccine is developed, pragmatic barriers to testing, licensing and
marketing would be staggering); JOHNSTON AND HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 127 (recognizing
that even if effective vaccines are developed, liability problems might foreclose or greatly limit
their distribution); Robert T. Schooley, The Quest for an AIDS Vaccine, in THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 135, 135-44 (Padraig O'Malley ed.,
1989) (noting that sufficient information is now known about life cycle of virus and its
structural components to formulate vaccine; however, successful vaccine development program
depends both on technological advances and on political will to create climate in which
vaccination can safely take place); VSI, supra note 2, at v (explaining problems current legal
system creates for vaccine manufacturers). The process of vaccine innovation, including basic
research, development, testing, production, and marketing involves many organizations in the
public and private sector. Id. Yet, the availability of vaccines for public use depends entirely
on the willingness of commercial manufacturers to undertake production. Id. Unfortunately,
numerous studies over the past 20 years indicate that market incentives fail to draw manufac-
turers into the vaccine area, especially in the wake of increased liability litigation. Id. See
generally infra part III (describing in detail tort liability problem in detail).
38. See, e.g., LANGONE, supra note 34, at 199 (describing deterrent effect of potential
tort liability on AIDS vaccine development); MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 2, at 230
(stating that "for more than decade United States has been struggling to develop just approach
to issues of liability for vaccine-related injury and of compensation for those who are injured");
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extremely expensive to produce and test-at least thirty to fifty million
dollars each.39 To this baseline cost manufacturers must add the threat of
liability for a wide array of lawsuits involving vaccine-induced injury, both
during clinical trials and general use. 4°
For over a decade there have been extensive lobbying efforts for tort
reform, fueled by the burden that strict product liability places on manu-
facturers4 1 particularly pharmaceutical manufacturers.4 2 Courts have made
Robert M. McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of a Vaccine
Against the AIDS Virus, U. Cm. L. Rav. 943 (1988) (explaining economic effects of tort
liability on vaccine manufacturers), reviewed in Product Liability Law and AIDS Vaccine
Development, BIoLAw § 3-8 (1988) (summarizing recent McKenna article); supra notes 3-6, 37
and accompanying text (describing and giving specific examples of the tort liability problem
in the pharmaceutical context); infra notes 40, 44 (same).
39. JomsTON & HoPKINs, supra note 21, at 126; LANGoNE, supra note 33, at 199; see
Huber, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that vaccines are expensive to develop and manufacture;
whereas, profit margins on vaccine sales have been historically quite low).
40. JOHNSTON & HopKINs, supra note 21, at 126; LANOoNE, supra note 33, at 199-200.
Once a manufacturer gts a vaccine on the market, the contemporary tort system has the
power to destroy not only the product, but also the entire company. Huber, supra note 1, at
10.
41. See George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope, and Charity at the FDA: the Politics
of AIDS Drug Trials, in AIDS AND THE EAL.TH CARE SYsm 193 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed.,
1990) (noting that drug companies will continue to lobby Congress and public to limit their
liability for harm caused by dangerous drugs by eliminating possibility of punitive damages
when FDA standards have been followed or by limiting liability for harm caused by vaccines);
William M. Sage, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 989, 989 (1988) (stating that "[t]he law of product liability increasingly compensates
purchasers injured by their purchases."); Product Liability, Experts Differ Over Effects Strict
Liability on Innovation, Daily Report For Executives, (BNA) No. 160, Aug. 18, 1988, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter Product Liability] (stating that in 1987 survey of 101
high-level corporate executives 62% agreed that innovation and experimentation has been
constrained, and 91% of those said liability system was major cause). See generally Linda
Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT LAW AND THE
Puauc INEREST 247-300 (Peter H. Shuck ed., 1991) (evaluating state tort law reform and
suggesting potential federal product liability reform legislation); W. Kip Viscusi, REFORmUNo
PRODUCTS LAmrr 1-13 (1991) (diagnosing liability crisis and suggesting proposals for reform).
42. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 611 (1990) (statement on behalf of Johnson & Johnson and
pharmaceutical industry) (arguing that nowhere have changes in law of product liability had
greater effect than in health care industry). This Johnson and Johnson statement cited the
1988 report of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association, remarking,
Product liability is having a profound negative impact on the development of new
medical technologies. Innovative new products are not being developed or are being
withheld from the market because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate
insurance. Certain older technologies have been removed from the market, not
because of sound scientific evidence indicating lack of safety or efficacy, but because
product liability suits have exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.
Id.
the increase of tort litigation involving pharmaceuticals, in particular, has spawned bitter
and frustrated statements. Roger S. Fine, A Personal Perspective from the "Manufacturer",
55 BROOK. L. Ray. 899, 899 (1989). A president of a large pharmaceutical company recently
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liability easier to prove and have upheld unprecedented damage awards. 43
The effect of such liability on vaccines and other pharmaceuticals jeopardizes
their development and marketing, escalates the price of existing products,
and forces manufacturers to remove necessary pharmaceuticals from the
market, causing supply shortages. 44
remarked,
If discovering and selling products that enhance and prolong human life is a
special interest, it is one of which we are proud. And the last time I looked, it was
an interest that society wanted us to pursue. Therefore, when we are accused of
being responsible for killing or injuring a fellow human being, and we know that
it's not true, we resent it personally and deeply.
Id. at 900.
43. Sage, supra note 41, at 989.
44. See Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 Hagv. L. REv. 773, 773 (1990) (arguing that dual regulation of phar-
maceuticals by tort system and FDA jeopardizes development and marketing of medications,
escalates costs of health care, and undermines objectives of the FDA); see also supra notes 3-
6, 37, 38 and accompanying text (detailing resultant effect of tort liability on pharmaceutical
manufacturers).
Numerous historical scenarios within the vaccine context evidence the problem the tort
system creates for manufacturers and the public. See Howard A. Denemark, Improving
Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side-effects:
Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE WEST. REs.
L. REv. 413, 413 (1989-90) (stating that "[b]eneficial drugs, approved by the United States
Food and Drug Administration, have been forced off the market by the current legal standards
for imposing a duty on drug manufacturers to warn of adverse side-effects from their drugs.").
Denemark explains that high damage awards exert a regulatory effect on drug manufacturers.
Id. at 415. Potential liability drives drug companies to withdraw products from the market,
and discourages research into new drugs to be used by individuals likely to sue and receive
large damage awards. Id. Even more alarming for the manufacturer is the fact that the FDA's
decision that a drug is safe, effective, and more beneficial than harmful can be nullified by
the regulatory effect of private tort actions. Id. This climate of second guessing of FDA
approval by juries has created a climate of uncertainty for the pharmaceutical industry. Product
Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 611 (1990) (statement on behalf of Johnson & Johnson and pharmaceutical
industry). The pharmaceutical manufacturer has no reliable means for predicting the future
viability of a drug once it reaches the market. Id. This climate of uncertainty has had an
adverse impact upon the public in the form of higher prices and fewer choices in the
marketplace. Id.
In the medical device context, recent complications involving intrauterine devices (IUD)
led to potential liability one thousand times greater than the profit from the product and
forced the maker of one such device, the Dalkon Shield, into bankruptcy. Sage, supra note
41, at 990 & n.5. Searle Laboratories reported spending $1.5 million in 1985 to defend itself
against four suits over its IUD-each of which the company won. Product Liability Reform
Act: Hearings on S.1400 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1990) (testimony by Harry Featherstone on behalf of National
Association of Manufacturers). After weighing the product's potential sales value of $11 million
a year against the future litigation costs, the company decided to discontinue the product. Id.
Recently, despite FDA approval of the drug Benedictin and its detailed warning infor-
mation, as well as a strong scientific consensus that it is not a teratogen, the regulatory power
of private tort actions forced the Benedictin from the market. Denemark, supra, at 428.
Benedectin was the only drug available to treat morning sickness. Product Liability Reform
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It is easy to understand why an AIDS vaccine manufacturer would be
concerned about product liability. Commentators have already analogized
the AIDS situation to that of the childhood disease, and swine flu vaccines.
45
In the aftermath of the swine flu immunization disaster in 1976-77, drug
companies still face billions of dollars of outstanding lawsuits. 46 Because of
the diverse complications that'could result from an AIDS vaccine, manu-
facturers confront a possible financial exposure many times greater than in
earlier vaccine scenarios.47 Furthermore, FDA's expedited approval process
has intensified manufacturers' liability concerns, because less is known about
the possible risks of a vaccine at this early stage, and a manufacturer must
incorporate potential liability concerns into decisions about which products
to develop and bring to market.48 The unavailability of liability insurance
Act: Hearings on S.1400 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
supra, at 612 (statement of George S. Frazza on behalf of Johnson & Johnson and pharma-
ceutical industry). In 1985, Benedectin's manufacturer, Merrell Dow, faced multiple suits
alleging that the drug caused birth defects. Id. After years of scientific study, the FDA and
the world-wide scientific community, have never found any credible evidence that Benedictin
causes birth defects. Id. Nonetheless, Merrell Dow was forced to take it off the market "solely
because of the threat of liability." Id.
Clearly, the specter of tort liability forced many manufacturers of childhood vaccines out
of the marketplace, leaving a large sector of the public with the risk of preventable diseases.
136 CONG. REc. S16,661 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (Sen. Heintz statement made in support of
creation of uniform federal rules for product liability). For example, Lederle Laboratories, the
sole producer of the DPT vaccine, raised its price per dose from $2.80 to $11.40 in 1987 to
pay the costs of increased law suits. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S.1400 Before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 281
(1990) (testimony by Harry Featherstone on behalf of the National Association of Manufac-
turers). Lenderle Labs is now the sole United States manufacturer of the DPT vaccine for
polio, and Merck & Co. is now the only producer of the combined measles, mumps, and
rubella vaccine-all others have left the field due to the threat of product liability lawsuits.
Id. The resultant effect has been an increase in these once nearly eradicated infectious diseases.
Snider, supra note 1, at 25.
The precise effects of tort liability on vaccine innovation and availability has been given
thorough consideration in the past. See VSI, supra note 2, at 85-122 (giving thorough history
of effect of tort liablity on vaccines development and production in United States). In 1985 a
national commission was created to review the problems of development, production and
marketing of vaccines to combat infectious disease in general. Id. at v. This effort was in
response to the access and supply problems surrounding the swine flu and childhood vaccines
in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. The commission researched and analyzed tort theory's treatment
of and effect upon vaccines in the United States. Id. at 27-65, 85-122. The commission
concluded that the handling of vaccine-related injury liability by the courts has left manufac-
turers apprehensive and uncertain about the extent of their responsibilities. Id. at 155. These
apprehensions act as a deterrent to vaccine production and thereby threaten the public health
by limiting the supply of therapies to prevent infectious disease. Id.
45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (detailing the analogy between the AIDS
situation and the swine flu vaccine).
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining the details of the swine flu
vaccination program and resulting liability problems).
47. JoHNSToN & HoprcNs, supra note 21, at 126.
48. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (stating that potential liability litigation
costs are factored into product cost). Representatives of small and medium sized companies
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adds to the concern of vaccine manufacturers. 49 Insurance companies are
already denying coverage to HIV vaccine researchers and manufacturers
and experts predict that the unavailability of liability insurance will delay
the marketing of any future FDA-approved vaccines. S
George Frazza, general counsel of Johnson & Johnson, states that strict
liability encourages timidity on the part of manufacturers because of the
uncertainty of what may be found to be a defect. According to Frazza, if
his company came up with an AIDS vaccine, he would advise withholding
it until Congress passes protective legislation.' Many other commentators
have noted that even if an HIV vaccine were available, no one would
manufacture it due to the cost of product liability suits.5 2 A brief overview
demonstrates the liability problem conventional tort theory causes phar-
maceutical manufacturers.
IV. PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS' Li4.BmrrY
FOR ADVERSE SIE-EFFECTS
Society depends on state tort law to discourage individuals from sub-
jecting others to unreasonable risks and to compensate those injured by
unreasonably risky behavior. 53
Under strict product liability theory, a manufacturer can be held liable
without fault for a "defective" product. Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402 recognizes three ways in which a product can be "defective":
(1) a manufacturing defect or flaw in production; (2) a design defect,
revealed by the existence of safer alternative constructions; and (3) a warning
defect, consisting of inadequate warnings or a total failure to warn of the
risks related to the proper design of the product.5 4 Most states have adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402 in some form. 5
suggest that the push for expanded access to AIDS drugs and vaccines could increase the
perception of liability for some therapy candidates, thereby making them less attractive to
potential sponsors. Ev NICHOLS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EXPANDING ACCESS TO INVESTIGA-
TIONAL THERAPIES FOR HIV INFECTION AND AIDS 50 (1991) (summary of roundtable conference
held by Institute of Medicine in 1991).
49. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining liability insurance problem
facing AIDS drug and vaccine manufacturers).
50. ABA AIDS COORDINATING Comm., supra note 24, at 147 (citing Report of the
Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 47-43 (June 24,
1988)). The insurability of vaccines and drugs is controversial in part because of the lack of
actual data. Id. at n.68. Insurability questions may inhibit biotechnological production of
vaccines. Id.; James T. O'Reilly, Biotechnology Meets Products Liability: Problems Beyond
the State of the Art, 24 Hous. L. REv. 451, 464 (1987).
51. Product Liability, supra note 41.
52. Rivas, supra note 18, at 123. See supra note 37 (commenting on practical and
economic barriers that will face future AIDS vaccines).
53. See Note, supra note 44, at 780 (examining ability of tort system to effectuate these
purposes within context of FDA-approved medications).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement language describes
the liability of a seller of defective products in the following manner,
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Because vaccine manufacturers are subject to the tort laws of all fifty
states, their liability is difficult to predict.5 6 Universally, however, courts
have found manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, including vaccines,
liable when their products result in adverse side-effects.5 7 Design defect and
failure to warn theories are the most common basis for these liability
claims.5 8 Damage awards are often extreme and exert a strong regulatory
effect on manufacturers' decisions concerning whether to develop or market
a vaccine.5 9 Interestingly, tort theory addresses both the economic problem
that strict liability creates for pharmaceutical manufacturers and the inherent
differences between pharmaceuticals and other consumer products. 60 That
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.; see also Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 473-75 (Cal. 1988) (explaining history
of strict liability for defective products under Restatement 402A and noting three types of
defect: design defect, manufacturing defect, and warning defect), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942
(1988); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 795 P.2d 915, 923 (Kan. 1990) (noting that there are
three types of product defects: manufacturing flaws, design defects, and inadequate warnings
regarding product use).
A manufacturing defect occurs when a product falls below the manufacturers' own
standards, i.e., when an abnormality makes the product more dangerous than intended. See
PAGE W. KEETON ET AL., PROSsER AD KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 99(l), at 695 (5th
ed. 1984). A design defect occurs when the product meets the manufacturers' own standards,
but is more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would expect when using it in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or if the benefits of the design do not outweigh its risks.
See id. § 99(3), at 698. Even a flawlessly manufactured and designed product may be considered
unreasonably dangerous if the manufacturer or seller fails to warn or adequately warn, of a
risk or hazard associated with the product's use. See id. § 99(2), at 697-98.
55. Brown, 751 P.2d at 474 (citing KEETON, supra § 99, at 694 (5th ed. 1984)).
56. Joseph Early, Can Biotechnology Immunize Vaccine Manufacturers from the Products
Liability Crisis?, JuRsmmcs J., Spring 1990, at 356.
57. See Note, supra note 44, at 777-78 (noting that despite extensive FDA regulatory
scheme and potential exclusion under Restatement's comment k, pharmaceutical manufacturers
are still found strictly liable).
58. Early, supra note 56, at 356.
59. See Sage, supra note 41, at 989-90 nn.3-6 (arguing that courts have made liability
easier to prove and have upheld unprecedented damage awards).
60. Id. at 990-91 & nn.7-8. A significant concern is that the rationale behind product
liability does not apply well to an AIDS vaccine. The rationale behind imposition of liability
without fault is threefold: First, the manufacturer is in the best position to anticipate and
guard against the risks; second, the manufacturer can distribute the cost among the public;
and third, it is in the public interest to discourage marketing of defective products. Brown v.
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attempt has resulted in a complicated mass of exceptions to pure strict
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988). These
policies do not appear to justify liability without fault in the HIV vaccine context. First,
medical products are different from other goods because they are products which necessarily
interact with the human body in order to be effective. See Sage, supra note 41, at 990 (noting
that medical products, particularly drugs available exclusively by prescription, are different
from other goods because they must intimately interact with consumer's body). Thus, the
chemistry of the patient may contribute as much to the risk of an adverse side effect as does
the chemistry of the vaccine. Id.; see Cooper, supra note 6, at 19 (arguing that it is reasonable
to assume that AIDS vaccine, like other vaccines, will produce some serious adverse side-
effects in at least statistically small number of vaccinees). The California Supreme Court
recently noted perhaps the most important distinction between prescription drugs and other
products-prescription drugs are needed to reduce pain and save lives, and prevent harm to
at least some users is unavoidable. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 . Additionally it is often noted
that individuals have a fundamental freedom of choice to make medical decisions that is
especially acute during chronic illness. See Richman, supra note 25, at 412 (noting that with
thousands of HIV-infected people facing prospect of fatal illness there is understandable
impatience with any restrictions in making effective therapeutic measures quickly and widely
available); Martin Delaney, The Case for Patient Access to Experimental Therapy, 261 JAMA
2444, 2444 (1989) (stating that for HIV victims with life-threatening illness it seems inhumane
for government to deny access to treatments that might offer hope, however slim that hope
might be). But see Fauci, supra note 7, at 116-17 (stating that balance must be struck between
rigorous demands of scientific method involved in conducting proper clinical trials and rights
of patients suffering from life-threatening disease to gain access to potentially effective new
therapies at earliest feasible time).
Some commentators note that the societal interest in discouraging "unreasonable risk"
is ill-placed in the AIDS context. Deanna Hodgin, Desperate to Live, INsIGHT, Sept. 16, 1991,
at 11, 17 (noting that many AIDS activists insist on primacy of free choice). John Greenberg,
treatment advisor of ACT UP New York, has stated that "[sluppressing information and
treatments may deprive us of something that works." Id. If the chronically ill have a uniquely
fundamental right to free choice in medical treatment the rationale underlying product liability
breaks down. Yet another AIDS activist, Grace Powers Monaco, recognizes that free choice
is not entirely free. Id. (noting statements of Monaco). Monaco notes that patients have the
right to choose, but that freedom of choice means freedom of informed choice. Id. This
patient freedom does not mean freedom to choose erroneously by being confined only to the
hype in brochures and promotional anecdotes put out by promoters of unproven and untested
therapies. Id. "Medical ethicists say that patients should be free to choose any treatment, or
no treatment at all, 'so long as they are capable of understanding a treatment and making a
decision."' Id. (noting statement of Mary Faith Marshall, assistant professor at Center for
Biomedical Ethics at University of Virginia concerning cronically ill person's access to medical
treatments). The decision does not have to be a rational one, but it does have to be based on
the patient's value system. Id. Marshall says health providers and manufacturers should disclose
the risks, benefits and side-effects for each potential drug or treatment, as well as alternatives
to treatment. Id. Additionally, the existence of competing societal interests play into any
availability-of-treatment decision. Some commentators worry that the vaccine manufacturers'
profit motive will result in the marketing of unsafe or unproven treatments. Id. Others, as
noted above, emphasize the right to choice of the chronically ill individual. Scientists insist
that drug access must be closely regulated to ensure the systematic collection of the scientific
data necessary to determine treatment safety and efficacy. Id. Thus, the decision to obtain
experimental or new drugs in life threatening situations is both a very personal and an
institutional decision. See Fauci, supra note 7 (discussing both sides of debate over informed
choice and treatment access for critically ill individuals). W
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product liability.6 ' The exceptions include: (1) exemption from liability for
"unavoidably unsafe products" under the Restatement's comment k to
section 402A; (2) judicial or statutory establishment of a duty to warn
standard; (3) the learned intermediary doctrine, and; (4) the government
standards defense.
A. Protection for Manufacturers under Restatement (Second) Section
402A, comment k
Comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A recog-
nizes an exception to strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe products." 62
This provision protects manufacturers whose products are enormously
beneficial to society yet are incapable of being made completely risk free
for their intended use.63 Such products are not considered "defective" if
properly prepared and accompanied by adequate warnings. 4 The overwhelm-
ing majority of jurisdictions adopt comment k. 65 However, an examination
of relevant cases demonstrates that state courts are not consistent in their
application of the comment k exemption to pharmaceutical products."
Some state courts have extended the comment k exception to all pre-
scription drugs, holding that the drugs are by definition "unavoidably unsafe
61. Sage, supra note 41, at 990-91.
62. Comment k of the Restatement (Second) provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs .... Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the
like, many of which for this very reason can not legally be sold except to physicians,
or ... prescription. It is also true of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can
be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically cognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
RsTATEmTr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. k (1964) (italics in original).
63. Id.
64. Id. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing manufacturers' strict
liability under comment k exception); infra notes 81, 87 and accompanying text (discussing
manufacturers' strict liability for failure to warn or inadequate warnings).
65. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988) (citing jurisdictions that
have adopted comment k), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71 (discussing conflicting applications of
comment k). For an excellent discussion of the historical application of comment k within the
pharmaceutical context, see George H. King, A Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not
all Drugs Deserve Comment k Immunization, 21 Aiz. ST. L.J. 809 (1989).
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products" within the Restatement's description.67 The California Supreme
Court recently examined the rationale behind this blanket approach in Brown
v. Superior Court.68 The court noted that requiring a case-by-case deter-
mination of comment k applicability would impede significant advances in
scientific knowledge and discourage the development of new drugs to combat
disease. 69 The court concluded that to keep prescription drugs both available
and affordable, a court must assure the manufacturer that it will not hold
them strictly liable.
7 0
Most courts, however, have refused to apply comment k to every
pharmaceutical drug and still proceed on a case-by-case basis . 7 This ap-
67. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding
comment k automatically applies to design defect strict liability claims, but allowed plaintiff
to pursue a claim of strict liability for manufacturing defects, because comment k is not a
shield from those claims); Brown, 751 P.2d at 471 (holding that comment k applies to all
manufacturers of prescription drugs); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991)
(holding that FDA-approved drugs are as matter of law unavoidably unsafe within comment
k description); Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (1988) (same).
68. Brown, 751 P.2d at 473-77. In Brown the Supreme Court of California reviewed the
policy underlying comment k's strict liability exemption and comment k's past application by
other courts. Id. The court concluded that comment k should exempt all manufacturers of
prescription drugs from strict liability arising form claims alleging the defective design of their
products. Id. at 477. The court noted that a case by case determination of comment k
applicability would impede significant advances in scientific knowledge, and discourage the
development of new and improved drugs to combat disease. Id. at 479-82. To keep prescription
drugs both available and affordable, a manufacturer must be certain that it will not be held
strictly liable. Id. at 478-79, 81.
69. Id. at 482; see supra note 68 (discussing rationale behind strict product liability and
comment k exception); infra note 70 (same).
70. Brown, 751 P.2d at 482. The Brown court stressed three public policies mitigating
against imposition of strict liability for prescription drugs. Id. at 479-80 First, drug manufac-
turers might stop producing valuable drugs because of lost profits resulting from lawsuits or
the inability to secure adequate insurance. Id. at 479-80. Second, consumers have a vested
interest in prompt availability of new pharmaceutical products, and imposing strict liability
for design defects might cause manufacturers to delay placing new products on the market
even after those products receive FDA approval. Id. at 479. Finally, the added expense of
insuring against strict liability and additional research programs might cause the cost of
medication to increase to the extent that the medication would no longer be affordable to
consumers. Id.
71. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (acknowledging that vaccine
was "unavoidably unsafe" and then utilizing balancing approach to determine whether vaccine
was "so unsafe that marketing it at all [was] 'unreasonably dangerous per se"'), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Minn.
1988) (citing Toner, where court denied summary judgement and held that manufacturer must
prove that product is unavoidably unsafe based on resolution of material issues of fact); Patten
v. Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp 233, 236 (D. Utah 1987) (predicting that Utah would adopt
comment k); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991) (adopting comment k
under interpretation of Iowa case law and deciding to apply exception on case-by-case basis);
Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (holding courts must decide applicability
of comment k on case-by-case basis), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988); Savina v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990) (holding that courts should make application of
unavoidably unsafe products exception to strict liability on case-by-case determination); Johnson
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proach does little to ease the manufacturers' liability concerns because there
is no guarantee that the trier of fact will find a particular vaccine "una-
voidably unsafe".72 Moreover, even if the trier eventually finds the exemp-
tion applicable, the manufacturer has expended time and money on the
initial litigation.7 3 These factors play into the manufacturers' considerations
of product cost and profitability. 74 The confusion existing in several states
v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan. 1986) (appearing to hold that the
court should determine application of comment k on a case-by-case basis); Niemiera v.
Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1116 (N.J. 1989) (noting that New Jersey recently adopted case-by-
case basis for applying comment k to pharmaceuticals); Pollard v. Ashbury, 793 S.W.2d 394,
400 (Mo. App. 1990) (holding that comment k is affirmative defense and courts should
determine its applicability on case-by-case basis); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988) (specifically rejecting Brown and holding that comment k
protection extends to prescription drugs on case-by-case basis); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342
N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (holding comment k applicable only if manufacturer places drug
in question on market without adequate testing because of exigent circumstances). In Toner,
plaintiff's three-month-old child was paralyzed by defendant's vaccine. 732 P.2d at 299. The
Supreme Court of Idaho held that vaccines are not unavoidably unsafe products per se under
comment k and that courts should decide the application of comment k on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 309. The court also held that Lederle could be found negligent for having marketed
the only pertussis vaccine licensed by the FDA, instead of developing and obtaining FDA
approval for a fractionated-cell vaccine, although the FDA had previously withdrawn approval
of another firm's fractionated-cell vaccine. Id. at 312. Richard Cooper, an AIDS commentator,
notes that the potential consequences of the Toner decision, which the Supreme Court has
decline to review, are staggering. Cooper, supra note 6, at 19. Another frightening design
defect case for manufacturers is Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co, where the jury awarded
$2 million compensatory damages and $8 million punitive damages on the theory that the
Sabin polio vaccine was defectively designed because the Sabin vaccine was less safe than the
Salk vaccine. 718 P.2d 1318, 1320. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed in a 4-3 decision.
Id. at 1326. The Supreme Court granted immunity to the polio vaccine manufacturer because
the product was "unavoidably unsafe" and a "useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk." Id. at 1323. Yet it is unclear that the Johnson court
meant for comment k to apply to all vaccine manufacturers. Id. at 1322-24.
See also Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1981) (holding
comment k does not absolve drug manufacturers, here oral contraceptive manufacturer, in all
instances from design defect strict liability theory, and allowing recovery on defective design
theory); Feldman v. Lenderle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 380 (N.J. 1984) (holding that while "generally
the principal of strict liability is applicable to manufacturers of prescription drugs... [w]e do
not agree that the protective shield of comment k immunizes all" of them).
72. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (noting problems with
case-by-case determination of comment k application). According to the Grundberg court, in
determining whether a product is "unavoidably unsafe" a jury may consider: (1) Whether,
when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally important benefit that
made the products availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk posed by the
product both was substantial and unavoidable; and (3) whether the interest in availability
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through strict liability design
defect review. Id. at 93 & n.6. This case-by-case determination results in a "mini-trial" which
is unworkable because of the procedures impact on the development and marketing of new
drugs. Brown, 751 P.2d at 481; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
73. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 481-82 (arguing high litigation costs result when courts
proceed in case-by-case basis).
74. See supra notes 3-6 (describing how tort liability deterred development and access to
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regarding who-judge or jury-should decide the applicability of comment
k increases litigation unpredictabilty even further.71 Jury decisions can be
particularly quixotic, and the ensuing inconsistencies leave manufacturers in
a quandry. 76 Even more threatening for a manufacturer in states that use a
case-by-case approach is that FDA approval does not ensure against lia-
bility.7 7 Thus, the fact that the FDA completed a risk and benefit analysis
during the aproval stage does not mean that the trier of fact must find the
pharmaceutical "unavoidably unsafe." s78 Rather, FDA approval is merely
one factor the factfinder considers when making this determination.
79
In summary, comment k exemption from liability could effectuate the
desired result of consistency and predictability required to remove a portion
of the tort liability specter for manufacturers, but only if a blanket approach
is adopted in all states. This is far from the existing situation. More
importantly, commentators have stated that such a blanket approach is not
a desirable solution because it is an inflexible rule that ignores the differences
between various drugs.8 0 Yet, even if a vaccine fits within the "unavoidably
vaccines in the past); supra note 40 (stating that manufacturers add potential litigation costs
into product price); supra note 44 (noting that liability effects pharmaceutical development,
marketing and supply).
75. See King, supra note 66, at 819-20 (explaining that courts differ as to whether judge
or jury should balance the risks and benefits in determining the applicability of unavoidably
unsafe exception).
76. Id.
77. See Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 308-09 (Idaho 1987) (arguing extensive
risk benefit analysis preformed by FDA before approving prescription drug should foreclose
reassessment under comment k, nonetheless, case-by-case application of comment k by many
courts allows jury to override FDA's determination of safety despite inherent risks), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988); Mazur v. Merck & Co, 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding that manufacturers must meet state tort law requirements, in addition to satisfying
initial FDA requirements). The Mazur court noted that mere compliance with the FDA's
suggestion, regulation, or order does not override state tort law pertaining to drug manufac-
turers' liability. Id. Rather, compliance with FDA regulations may establish that manufacturer
met appropriate minimum standards of due care, but such compliance does not necessarily
absolve manufacturer of all liability. Id.; see also King, supra note 66, at 810, 817-18 (discussing
effect of FDA's decision to approve prescription drug on applicability of comment k).
78. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 305-09 (giving in-depth overview of factors trier of fact must
balance in determining whether vaccine is "unavoidably unsafe" under comment k); see also
supra note 77 (discussing effect of FDA approval on state tort law requirements).
79. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (noting that FDA's
risk-utility analysis would not supplant risk-utility analysis required in judicial process); Mazur,
742 F. Supp. at 247 (noting that FDA approval establishes only a minimum level of safety
which state tort law may override).
80. See King, supra note 66, at 829 (arguing that middle ground consisting of judicially
or legislatively created "presumptions and truncated analysis" fashioned in manner like
Childhood Vaccine Act is best solution to inadequacies of tort system). King argues that such
legislative enactments do not completely foreclose strict liability for plaintiffs injured by
vaccines, but establish presumptions to aid the trier of fact. Id. at 830-31. These presumptions
are rebuttable, allowing for flexibility when circumstances require special treatment. Id. at 831.
An additional advantage is that a legislative approach only affects one class of prescription
drugs, vaccines, unlike the Brown court's solution of a blanket exemption for prescription
drugs adopted pursuant to the Restatement's "unavoidably unsafe" exemption. Id.
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unsafe" exception under comment k, individuals suffering adverse side-
effects can still sue the manufacturer based on theories of design defect,
inadequate warning, and negligence. 81 Thus, even a blanket approach to
comment k for prescription drugs and vaccines does not foreclose the
manufacturers' litigation fears.
B. Design Defects and Failure to Adequately Warn Liability Theories
While allegations of design defects are unusual in vaccine cases,82 the
implications of the recent Toner v. Lederle Laboratories" opinion are
frightening 4 In Toner, the Supreme Court of Idaho recognized a phar-
maceutical company's potential liability under a design defect theory for
failure to promote and produce a different vaccine. 85 A three-month-old
baby was paralyzed after vaccination with Lederle's DPT vaccine. The court
held that it could find Lederle negligent for having marketed the vaccine,
notably the only pertussis vaccine approved by the FDA, instead of devel-
oping and obtaining FDA approval for a fractionated cell vaccine, for which
the FDA had previously withdrawn approval.86 While negligence actions are
beyond the scope of this article, the court's acknowledgement of potential
design defectiveness under these circumstances was both surprising and
frightening.
Under Restatement section 402A a manufacturer is liable for an inad-
equate warning even if the vaccine is deemed "unavoidably unsafe." 87 This
81. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981)
(same); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that by its terms,
comment k does not except product from strict liability where plaintiff alleges manufacturing
flaw or inadequate warning), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Toner, 732 P.2d at 305
(same); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942
(1988) (same); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990) (same); Feldman
v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 384 (N.J. 1984) (same); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 780 (R.I. 1988) (same); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 89 (Utah
1991) (same). Thus, most courts hold that establishing that the drug was properly prepared
and accompanied by adequate warnings of its dangerous propensities and inherent risks is a
prerequisite to the comment k exemption.
82. Vaccine injury cases proceeding under a design defect theory include: Petty v. United
States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1264; Williams v. Lederle Lab., 591
F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982).
83. 732 P.2d 297 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
84. Cooper, supra note 6, at 19 (noting staggering potential consequences of Toner
decision, which Supreme Court has declined to review).
85. Brown, 732 P.2d at 297.
86. Id. at 309-10 (stating that authorities universally agree that where product is deemed
unavoidably unsafe, plaintiff is deprived of strict liability cause of action, but may proceed
under negligence cause of action).
87. See, e.g., Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1439 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that
swine flu vaccine was unavoidably dangerous product under comment k, but because warnings
were inadequate, manufacturer was held strictly liable); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F.
Supp. 1332, 1335-6 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that even though comment k applied to DPT
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:559
type of defect is by far the most common basis for liability.8 The problem
posed for national manufacturers is that state courts use a wide array of
standards to determine the appropriate timing and adequacy of the warning
required. Normally, a manufacturer must warn of known or knowable risks
at the time of drug marketing.8 9 Yet some courts have found a duty to
warn when the danger of a side effect is "apparent,"9' or even when there
is only a hint of danger. 9'
In reviewing the adequacy of a warning, the trier of fact may take into
account the circumstances surrounding the communication of the warning. 92
Courts have held that a jury is free to conclude that the language of the
warning should have included data on incidence, should have been-clearer
or stronger, and that specific points should have been explained at greater
length or been given greater emphasis. 93 Moreover, when a hard-sell pro-
motional campaign encourages vaccination, the jury may rely on the cam-
paign to conclude that the literal text of the warning was diluted because
of the emotion surrounding distribution. 94 Thus the hype and promotion
certain to surround the introduction of an AIDS vaccine will require
manufacturers to give extremely potent warnings to meet the adequacy
standard. Even more worrisome is that while the jury may consider FDA
requirements for labeling, it is not bound by them in its inadequacy
determination. 95 Even if the FDA has required, approved or actually drafted
vaccine, inquiry would not be limited to failure to warn theory); Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (noting even if prescription drug were unavoidably unsafe,
comment k immunity would not eliminate strict liability for failure td provide a proper
warning); see supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing establisliment of adequate
warnings and design as prerequisites to "unavoidably unsafe" exemption).
88. Cooper, supra note 6, at 19.
89. KEETON, supra note 54, at 685; See, e.g., Petty, 740 F.2d at 1441 (finding warning
inadequate because it failed to apprise plaintiff of known risk of serum sickness); Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting manufacturers' duty is
to warn of all potential dangers which it knew, or in exercise of reasonable care should have
known to exist); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 471, 476 n.4 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that manufacturers of drug were liable for failure to warn of dangers they knew or could have
know at time drug was released), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988). For an analysis of a
manufacturers' duty to warn of possible known or knowable dangers see Carol A. Cheney,
Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Rela-
tionship Between Chemical Manufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 Nw. U.
L. REV. 562 (1991); James Britain, Product Honesty is the Best Policy: A Comparison of
Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer
Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 342 (1984).
90. See Denemark, supra note 44, at 443 (discussing court's use of "apparent standard"
in duty to warn cases); see also infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (describing apparent
standard).
91. See Denemark, supra note 44, at 438 (noting some courts hold manufacturers to
hint of danger standard).
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the specific warning in question, a lay jury can still conclude that it was
inadequate. 96 Thus, the latitude of the various state approaches to the
adequacy of warning determination and the inconclusiveness of FDA-ap-
proval prevents manufacturers from predicting the adequacy of any partic-.
ular warning.
1. Establishment of a Consistent National Standard for Warnings
State product liability law and federal regulatory law have been butting
heads for several decades.Y The effect of the dual system is that tort
litigation often repeats de novo the risk and benefit analysis performed by
the FDA during the pharmaceutical approval process. In the past the trier
of fact has found a pharmaceutical manufacturer liable for an inadequate
warning although the FDA mandated, verbatim, the warning at issue. 9 As
a solution to these conflicting systems, several states have adopted product
liability statutes that recognize compliance with governmental regulations or
"state of the art" as valid defenses. 99 Other commentators have suggested
pre-emption by federally enacted national standards, such as FDA-approval,
as a possible solution.100
Yet another alternative is the establishment of a legal duty to warn
based on the "apparent standard."'' 1 To be successful under the "apparent
standard", a plaintiff must show that the risk of a certain side effect was
"apparent"-that is, recognized by at least a respectable minority of experts.
96. Id. For a detailed discussion of the conflict between state tort law and federal
regulation, see Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and
State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOoD DRUG CosM. L.J. 171 (1986); Mazur v. Merck &
Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 245-48 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (denying manufacturers' motion for summary
judgement on grounds that federal regulation of vaccine labels and package circulars does not
preempt state law requirements).
97. Note, supra note 44, at 773; Walsh & Klein, supra note 96, at 171.
98. Note, supra note 44, at 779 & 779 n.39.
99. See Amuz Rnv. STAT. ANN § 12-683(1) (West 1982) (providing that proof of compliance
with state of art constitutes complete defense in any product liability defective design or
fabrication action); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105 (Michie 1987) (providing that proof of
compliance with governmental standard comprises evidence that product is not unreasonably
dangerous in product liability action); CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)-(2) (1987) (providing
that proof of compliance with either "state of the art" or governmental standard gives rise
to rebuttable presumption of non-negligence and non-defectiveness in any product liability
action); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1990 Supp.) (providing that
compliance with state of the art gives rise to rebuttable presumption of non-negligence and
non-defectiveness in any product liability action); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-28-104 (Michie
1980) (providing that compliance with governmental standard gives rise to rebuttable presump-
tion of non-negligence and non-defectiveness in any product liability action).
100. See King, supra note 66, at 830-31 (suggesting set of presumptions and truncated
analysis prescribed by federal law); Note, supra note 44, at 785-93 (giving arguments proposing
and opposing FDA-approval as pre-emptor of state tort claims); see also Denemark, supra
note 44, at 15 (providing excellent summary of the proponents and opponents arguments of
preemption based on FDA approval).
101. See Denemark, supra note 44, at 442, 448 (explaining use of apparent standard in
product liability actions). Some courts have already adopted the "apparent standard." Id. at
444.
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Thus, a manufacturer would be liable if its warning failed to relate to the
consumer the current state of knowledge, which does not include warnings
based on dubious scientific evidence.le 2 But the establishment of a consistent
warning standard does not end the manufacturers' problems, because man-
ufacturers still face the dilemma of determining to whom the warning must
be given. 13
2. The "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
Commentators suggest that legislation protecting potential AIDS vaccine
manufacturers is not necessary because of the protection available under
the "learned intermediary doctrine."' 1 4 As a general rule, a manufacturer
has no duty to warn ultimate users of known product-use dangers when a
prescribing physician acts as an intermediary between the manufacturer and
the user.105 Under this rule, the manufacturer discharges its duty to warn
the patient by warning a "learned intermediary"-usually the prescribing
physician or health care provider. °6 The learned intermediary then transmits
the relevant information to the patient.l°7 The Restatement of Torts (Second)
accepts the learned intermediary doctrine, 08 and most jurisdictions consid-
ering whether a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn individual patients
have adopted this approach.' °9
However, commentators recently criticized the learned intermediary
doctrine, contending that the doctrine incorrectly presumes that the physician
will provide the appropriate risk information to patients." 0 In fact, patients
frequently receive little or no information concerning the drugs their phy-
102. Id. at 449.
103. See infra notes 104-26 and accompanying text (discussing to whom manufacturer
owes duty to warn).
104. McKenna, supra note 38, at 957, 962.
105. McKenna, supra note 38, at 957-63.
106. Cheney, supra note 89, at 571; McKenna, supra note 38, at 958.
107. Cheney, supra note 89, at 571; McKenna, supra note 38,, at 958.
108. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 388(c) cmt. n (1965) states:
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the information
necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from
liability. It is merely a means by which this information is to be conveyed to those
who are to use the chattel. The question remains whether this method gives a
reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends
upon their having it... [I]t is obviously impossible to state in advance any set of
rules which will automatically determine in all cass whether one supplying a chattel
for the use of others through a third person has satisfied his duty to those who are
to use the chattel by informing the third person of the dangerous character of the
chattel, or of the precautions which must be exercised in using it in order to make
its use safe.
Id.
109. Cheney, supra note 89, at 572 n.135. See id. (listing specific court cases adopting
learned intermediary doctrine).
110. Margaret Gilhooly, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient Infor-
mation, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 674-76 (1986).
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sicians prescribe."' Two recent cases cast further doubt on the continued
validity of the learned intermediary doctrine in the pharmaceutical context."
2
Practitioners note that MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp."3 and
In re Certified Questions' 4 suggest that the learned intermediary doctrine
could be limited in the future, with a case-by-case analysis replacing the
previous certainty and predictability provided by the rule."
5
Even assuming the doctrine survives this recent attack, it is doubtful
that the learned intermediary doctrine will apply to AIDS vaccine manu-
facturers for two reasons. First, the rationale behind the doctrine is not
logically applicable to AIDS therapies.1' 6 The learned intermediary rule
embodies the practical circumstances surrounding the distribution of pre-
scription drugs." 7 Thus the rule exempting manufacturers from a direct
warning to the vaccinee is based on several assumptions: The physician is
in a better position to inform the patient of the dangers involved with the
vaccination; the physician will exercise informed judgement gained through
independent learning, experience with the individual patient, and the man-
ufacturers' warning to him of the associated risks; and, most importantly,
the physician will in fact communicate the warnings to the patient, whereas
the manufacturer could not do so because of the sheer numbers involved.,"
A court may easily conclude that these assumptions simply are not valid in
the AIDS vaccination context. First, a vaccine administrator, whether phy-
sician or nurse, will not necessarily know enough about the risks associated
with a new AIDS vaccine to substitute his warning for that of the manu-
facturer. 1 9 Commentators already note that physicians prescribing AIDS
drugs are not very well-informed, especially in the context of the FDA's
expedited access program.2 0 In addition, many ethicists argue that when
111. See id. (noting that surveys indicate that substantial proportions of patients claimed
to have received no information on drug risks); David B. Brushwood & Larry M. Simonsmeier,
Drug Information for Patients: Duties of the Manufacturer, Pharmacist, Physician, and
Hospital, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 279 (1986) (noting numerous studies that indicate quality and
quantity of information about drugs provided patients is inadequate).
112. Walsh & Klein, supra note 96, at 189.
113. 475 N.E.2d 65, cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 250 (1985).
114. 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984).
115. Walsh & Klein, supra note 96, at 192.
116. McKenna, supra note 38, at 959.
117. Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
118. See Cheney, supra note 89, at 573-76 (stating and critiquing basic rationales typically
asserted in support of learned intermediary doctrine); see also, Mazur, 742 F. Supp. at 252
(discussing the learned intermediary doctrine's application in vaccination context). In Mazur
the court explained that application of learned intermediary rule has depended on "extent of
the medical professional's involvement in the decision to administer the drug." Id. The doctrine
has been found to apply in situations where the medical professional exercises his "individual
medical judgement bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative." Id. at 252.
119. See 0 'Reilly, supra note 50, at 479-81 & n.107 (arguing that learned intermediary
doctrine is applicable only in situations where learned intermediary understands risks in
sufficient detail).
120. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting expanded access creates increased
liability concerns for manufacturers).
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dealing with a critical illness, it is crucial that the patient-not the prescribing
physician-make the final decision regarding the risk involved.' 2' This would
be impossible if the doctor cannot thoroughly explain the risks of vaccination
or simply fails to inform the patient.2 2
Second, and most importantly, the learned intermediary doctrine is not
typically applicable in mass immunization contexts, where the courts have
noted an exception to the doctrine for two reasons: First, vaccination occurs
without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks of vaccina-
tion; and second, there is no close communication between the physician
and the patient during which the physician informs the patient of the
vaccination risks and dangers.Iu According to the learned intermediary
doctrine the manufacturers' warning must reach the patient for the substitute
warning logic to make sense. 24 Under mass immunization precedent it is
not sufficient that the warning reach the public-health officials who design
and administer the immunization program. 25 Thus, the rationale behind the
exemption breaks down in the mass vaccination context. Because the long-
term goal of an AIDS vaccine is mass immunization, the learned interme-
diary doctrine is of little probable protection for a manufacturer. 26
121. See supra note 60 (giving in-depth discussion of conflicting results of quick and easy
drug access).
122. See Gilhooley, supra note 110, at 637, 670, 674-75 (noting that physicians rarely
explain anything at all about risk of treatments they prescribe, thus warnings never reach
patient); see also supra note Il1 and accompanying text (stating that patients receive little or
no information about risks from their physicians).
123. Cheney, supra note 89, at 587. Courts have carved out two exceptions to the learned
intermediary doctrine: oral contraceptives and vaccines. Id. at 586 Both exceptions were created
because of specific characteristics not typical of prescription drugs generally. Id. In the
vaccination context the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the physician will not
be intimately involved with any particular patient, thus the manufacturer retains the duty to
warn the patient, who is the ultimate user. Id. at 587 (citing Barbara P. Flannagan, Comment,
Products Liability: The Continued Viability of the Learned Intermediary Rule as it Applies to
Product Warnings for Prescription Drugs, 20 U. RIcH. L. REv. 405, 414 (1986)). But see
Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that all vaccine cases
recognize theoretical validity of "mass immunization exception" to learned intermediary rule,
but very few find situations where its application is warranted). Often commentators and
courts state that the only exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is in cases involving
mass immunization programs, where (1) the treatment decision is generally made by patient
outside of traditional physician-patient relationship; and (2) medication is given in assembly
line fashion. Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1428 (8th Cir. 1984); Reyes v. Wyeth
Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Walsh & Klein,
supra note 96, at 189.
124. Cooper, supra note 6, at 19.
125. Id. The first court to adopt this view thought it easy for the manufacturer to reach
the ultimate patients. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 121, 121 (9th Cir. 1968). Yet,
manufacturers operating under Murphy's law and contemplating all the foul-ups that can occur
trying to communicate warnings to many vaccines, might take a different view. Cooper, supra
note 6, at 19.
126. See Mazur, 742 F. Supp. at 252-54 (holding learned intermediary doctrine did not
apply to manufacturer where physician was not present and never made an individualized
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C. The "Government Contract Defense"
The government contract defense is a relatively recent development that
may protect manufacturers in mass vaccination litigation. 27 Under this
theory, a company that has complied with the FDA requirements for
approval has a legal defense to a negligence claim. '2 This mechanism would
prevent judges or juries from second-guessing the conclusions of the regu-
latory agency. 29 The defense contains two large pitfalls regarding application
in an adverse side-effect case: the defense does not provide protection from
strict product liability, and the protection from negligence allegations may
not extend to unapproved products-that is, those still in the testing stage. 30
V. SOLUTIONS
For more than a decade the United States legal system has been
struggling to develop a just approach to the issue of liability for vaccine-
related injury.' The application of traditional tort theory to manufacturers
greatly hinders the development and marketing of vaccines because of the
difficulty in complying with the variety of state standards,3 2 the unpredict-
assessment of MMR II vaccination risks for 300,000 elementary school students). Even in
vaccination cases where the court has held the learned intermediary doctrine suffices to relieve
a manufacture of his duty to warn the vaccinee directly, a physician who weighed the risks
and benefits of the drug for each patient was required, as opposed to pure mass vaccination
by a nurse or administrator. See Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1117 (N.J. 1989)
(holding that learned intermediary doctrine applied to DPT vaccination where "physician
almost invariably sees the patient before the vaccination is given" and physician weighs risk
and benefits for "each patient"); Mazur, 742 F. Supp. at 252 (noting that in many, but not
all, vaccine cases learned intermediary rule has been applied, since physician or physician's
aid, administered vaccine); see also Samuels v. American Cyanamid Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006
(1985) (holding that pharmaceutical company had duty to warn recipient of vaccines when
company knew vaccines were ordinarily given without "meaningful" balancing of risks and
benefits by "informed" intermediary). Thus the mass immunization level AIDS vaccination
would not be protected because there would not be a learned intermediary performing an
individualized balancing of risks, both because of the complexity of the new AIDS vaccine
and the large immunization numbers.
127. Cooper, supra note 6, at 18. In general the government contract defense applies
where the defendant supplied an article to the government pursuant to specifications, and the
government knew as much as the defendant about the hazards of the article. Id.
128. Id.
129. NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 51. Under this theory, a company that has complied with
the FDA requirements for approval has a legal defense to a negligence claim. This mechanism
would prevent judges or juries from second guessing the conclusions of the FDA. Id. The
future of such a defense is now before the Supreme Court on certiorari in Grumman Areospace
Corp. v. Shaw, No. 85-1529.
130. Nichols, supra note 48, at 51.
131. MOBIIZNG AGAnsT AIDS, supra note 2, at 230.
132. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining that manufacturers are subject
to tort law of fifty states).
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ability of the protections within the tort system, 3 3 the large damage awards,134
and the incompatibility of strict product liability with governmental regu-
lation.135 The government must decide whether the HIV epidemic represents
a special case, and, if so, how to structure a workable system for allocating
responsibility for the adverse side-effects that inevitably will occur.' 36 The
available approaches include: (1) Mass immunization statutes; (2) product
liability reform legislation; and, (3) legislation immunizing manufacturers
and setting up compensation funds for injured vaccinees.
37
Several states have enacted legislation altering either, or both, an injured
vaccinees' compensation options or a manufacturers' responsibility in strict
liability. In fact, most of the legislative response to the AIDS epidemic has
occurred at the state level.' States have passed more than 170 laws dealing
with the disease. 39 Yet, only five of these laws address the vaccine liability
problem. 140 Federal legislation, on the other hand, has not dealt with product
liability issues at all, but covers five other basic areas including: (1) research,
(2) education, (3) testing and counseling, (4) non-discrimination civil rights,
and (5) financing.' 4' Congress recently authorized the FDA to accelerate
133. See supra notes 60-61 and accomjanying text (explaining exceptions within tort
theory).
134. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing large damage awards in
pharmaceutical cases).
135. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (describing conflict between federal
regulatory system and state tort law).
136. See MOBIiZiNG AGAINST AIDS, supra note 2, at 231 (advocating alternative solution
to treatment by traditional tort theory).
137. See NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 50-51 (stating summarized solutions proposed at the
1988 "Roundtable for the Development of Drugs & Vaccines Against AIDS", which include:
Modification of state tort law doctrine to eliminate strict product liability for pharmaceutical
products, and federal standardization of state product liability decisions); McKenna, supra
note 38, at 943 (stating proposed measures to protect AIDS vaccine manufacturers, including
federal or state assumption of liability for injuries caused by privately manufactured vaccines
and statutory modification of prevailing common law strict liability for design and warning
defects); Sage, supra note 41, at 1025 (concluding that "[f]or prescription drugs, which are
nationally marketed and regulated by FDA, the lack of a uniform federal product liability
statute, the unpredictability of jury verdicts, and the expense and risk of developing new drugs
threatens the availability and innovation of important treatments.").
138. Rivas, supra note 18, at 110 (citing GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, A REvIEw OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
AffECTING AIDS 1 (1985)).
139. Barry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and
Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 JAMA 1621, 1621 (1989). See generally, QuAM &
FORD, supra note 8, at 1-36 (providing overview of State AIDS legislation). The typical
progression has been for a state to create a task force or study commission to examine various
aspects of AIDS, then after a period of review, the legislature drafts appropriate legislation.
QuA & FORD, supra note 8, at 32. See Rivas, supra note 18, at 110 n.38, for a listing of
state task forces.
140. See infra pp. 13-16 (discussing state AIDS legislation).
141. AIDS AND Tm CouRTs, supra note 15, at 327. See id. at 327-34, for an overview of
federal legislation in these areas and id. at 335-41 for an overview of state AIDS legislation
on testing, reporting, confidentiality, knowing transmission, and treatment financing. The most
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the approval process for clinical trials and marketing of AIDS-related
treatments, thus enabling quicker access. 42 However, technology is useless
if manufacturers are not willing to produce the enormous quantities of
drugs or vaccines required. 4  Even more discouraging is that the new
expanded access is likely to deter vaccine development because of the
manufacturers' increased perception of risk regarding product liability suits. 44
So far, the federal government has declined to address the obstacle of tort
liability; thus, the prospect of strict liability for adverse side-effects confronts
manufacturers seeking to develop and market vaccines.' 4
A. Current State Legislation
Several states passed legislation dealing with a manufacturers' liability
for AIDS drugs and vaccines.'" Three states created a general fund which
is used to compensate AIDS vaccine-injured individuals without requiring
them to resort to tort litigation. 47 Two state's statutes go further than a
mere compensation fund and actually immunize manufacturers from strict
product liability suits for AIDS drug or vaccine-related injuries. 4'
In 1983 California became the first state to pass laws establishing policies
for responding to AIDS, 49 and in 1986 took specific action to remove the
impediments to the quick development of an AIDS vaccine by passing the
first AIDS immunization legislation. 50 The California AIDS Vaccine Statute
immunizes manufacturers from product liability suits and sets up a special
recent state AIDS legislation can be obtained from Lisa Bowleg, AIDS Policy Center, The
George Washington University Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, Washington, D.C.
142. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1988). The life-threatening circumstances facing AIDS patients
creates a demand for major revisions in protocol and acceleration in processes for approving
new experimental medical treatments. Brad Stone, How AIDS Has Changed FDA, 24 FDA
CONsumER No. 1, 14, 14-16 (1990). In October 1988 the FDA announced its new policy
providing quicker access to experimental drugs for patients with life-threatening illness like
AIDS. Id. at 15-16.
143. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (noting manufacturers will not produce
HIV vaccine unless immunized from liability); supra note 37 (discussing legal complexities
facing manufacturers of potential AIDS vaccines).
144. See NicHoLs, supra note 48, at 45 (arguing that earlier access necessarily means less
knowledge of risk, thus increases liability potential for manufacturers).
145. See supra pp. 12-13 (discussing pharmaceutical manufacturers' tort liability problems).
Three states have responded by enacting legislation directly addressing the need for an
alternative to traditional tort liability for manufacturers of AIDS drugs and vaccines. See
supra pp. 13-16 (discussing state AIDS legislation).
146. CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE § 199.47-.52 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (AIDS
compensation fund); 1991 Co N. Pun. ACT 349 (informed consent & immunization for research
testing).
147. See infra pp. 13-15 (detailing state AIDS legislation).
148. See infra pp. 13-15 (detailing state AIDS legislation).
149. Rivas, supra note 18, at 112.
150. CAL. HEALTH & SAsa-rv CODE §§ 199.45-.51 (1986) (amended 1988). See Rivas, supra
note 18, at 112 (detailing California's legislative response to AIDS epidemic).
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fund from which victims of adverse side-effects can be compensated.' The
Act encourages development of an HIV vaccine through a two-tiered ap-
proach: by providing compensation for victims, and by removing the dis-
couraging specter of a product liability suit. 5 2 The original statute provided
limited protection for the manufacturers of an FDA-approved vaccines by
exempting the manufacturers from strict liability suits for design or warning
defects.' Thus, the Act had loopholes because it did not foreclose all strict
products liability suits. Furthermore, the Act both originally and in its
current form exempts clinical trials, one of the most risky periods for
manufacturers, from the immunization provision completely. 54
In 1988 California repealed the provision of the Act providing limited
liability for manufacturers of an AIDS vaccine.'55 The 1988 revisions at-
tempted to encourage vaccine manufacturers by leaving in place the AIDS
Compensation Fund and by ensuring a profitable market for AIDS vaccines
through state-gauranteed purchasing.5 6 A surcharge on the sale of state or
federal approved AIDS vaccine finances the fund that compensates injured
vaccinees.15' Financing the fund by a product tax, which manufacturers are
sure to incorporate into product cost, adds to the current problem of
exorbitant AIDS drug prices. 5 ' Moreover, with the immunity provision
repealed the Act allows plaintiffs the option of tort lawsuits, thus, manu-
facturers are in no way assured vaccine-injured individuals will resort to
the compensation fund. 5 9
151. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.49-.51 (1986) (amended 1988 & 1990). Section
199.49 immunizes manufacturers from strict product liability in most circumstances. (repealed
and replaced by Stat.1988, ch. 1555, § 3 (1988)). Section 199.50 sets up the "AIDS Vaccine
Victims Compensation Fund." [
152. See Rivas, supra note 18, at 122 (stating that California insulated manufacturers
from uncertain liability in effort to encourage development of HIV vaccine).
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.49 (West 1986) (repealed and replaced 1988).
Section 199.49 prohibited compensation from the fund if (1) the victim was "comparatively
negligent", (2) the "manufacturer had been found liable.. .in a court", for negligence or a
legal basis other that section 199.45 strict liability, or (3) if vaccinations were administered
during a clinical trial. Id.
154. Id. § 199.50(c)(3).
155. CAL. HEALTH & SaETY CODE §199.49, repealed by 1988 Cal. Stat. 1555 § 3. The
immunity provisions had not yet been utilized in court and no reasons were given for the
repeal. Rivas, supra note 18, at 122.
156. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50-.51 (West Supp. 1992). The purpose of the
state-gauranteed purchase of FDA or state-approved AIDS vaccines was dual: First, govern-
mental purchase of the vaccine ensures that at least 175,000 HIV-infected individuals can
afford vaccination; and, second, the ensured purchase gaurantees manufacturers a worthwhile
return on thier investment. Id. § 199.51(a).
157. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(o) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). The surcharge,
not to exceed $10 per unit of vaccine, will be levied on the sale of each unit of vaccine sold,
delivered, administered or dispensed in California. Id.
158. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (noting federal proposal by Keystone
group rejected California's funding scheme). A taxing funding mechanism poses practical
problems in addition to increasing product cost because initially there will be a lack of money
in the fund-because the Act puts a cap of ten dollars per unit on the vaccine tax. Id.
159. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(m).
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In 1991 Connecticut enacted the second AIDS vaccine liability law. l' °
The Connecticut statute provides immunity to manufacturers, researchers,
and research institutions for vaccine-related injuries on research subjects as
long as written informed consent is obtained prior to vaccination.' 6' A major
drawback for future application of the law is that it only addresses liability
in research settings.
62
In 1991 Massachusetts created the "Massachusetts AIDS Fund." 163 The
commissioner of public health controls the fund which is financed by public
and private appropriations, gifts, grants and donations.' 64 The state health
commissioner, with the advice and guidance of an advisory board, can use
the moneys for "research treatment, experimental treatment, and education
relating to the acquired immune deficiency syndrome."' 6 The definition of
"experimental treatment" includes treatments not yet approved for general
use by a federal agency. 66 The term "research" includes scientific study
through community-based efforts to determine the effectiveness of drug and
nondrug therapies in combatting the HIV infection. 67 Thus, while the fund
does not specifically intend to compensate injured vaccinees, it could fore-
seeably be used to do so.
6
Changes in product liability laws can also decrease a manufacturers'
liability concerns. Most states have enacted product liability reform legis-
lation in an attempt to curb litigation and high product cost. 69 Such
160. 1991 CONN. PUB. AcT 349.
161. Id. See AIDS Policy Center, State Laws Related to Liability for AIDS Vaccines (The
George Washington University Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 5, 1991 (summarizing Connecticut statutory provision). The Connecticut act does not
extend immunity where a researcher was grossly negligent, reckless, or failed to comply with
the law. Id.
162. 1991 CoNN. PUB. ACT 349.
163. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 10, § 35J (Law. Co-op. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991 and
expires July 1, 1995).
164. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 10, § 35J (Law. Co-op. 1991). Under an accompanying law
individuals are encouraged to contribute their state tax refunds to the Massachusetts AIDS
Fund. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 6G (Law. Co-op. 1991).
165. MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 10, § 35J (Law. Co-op. 1991). The fund can be used to
furthe" the purposes as set out in chapter I11 sections 2D and E. Id.
166. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 2D (Law. Co-op. 1991).
167. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 2D (Law. Co-op. 1991).
168. See HAw. Ray. STAT § 325-6 (1985) (creating a similar fund to finance preventable
disease). In 1986 Hawaii created an "Epidemic Control Fund" which could be used to
compensate injured vaccinees. Id. Under the Hawaii program the department of health may
apply the resources of the fund toward controlling, suppressing, or preventing the spread of
any communicable or preventable disease. Id. The fund is not specifically directed toward
AIDS, but could foreseeably be used to compensate injured vaccinees.
169. See generally, Glenn Blackman & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation:
Assessing Our Control of Risks, TORT LAW AND m Puauc INTERST 272, 272-99 (Pete H.
Shuck, ed., 1991) (discussing need for tort reform and states' various reform efforts thus far);
Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races". The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. Rav. 207 (same). See Blackman & Zeckhauser, supra at 295-98
for specific product liability reform provisions of each state.
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legislation varies greatly in subject matter and scope, but typically provides
for qualified immunity; limited liability for manufacturers of "inherently
unsafe" products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or drugs; and caps or pro-
hibits entirely punitive damages.7 0 These statutes may help curb the problems
associated with AIDS vaccines and tort liability. For instance, California's
Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987 contained a section that substantially
altered the state's product liability law.' 7 ' This provision may have great
national significance because California is a leader in the development of
product liability law. 72 The provision affords medical device and drug
manufacturers protection from punitive damage awards provided they meet
certain government standards-or "state of the art" defense-and do not
intentionally withhold or misrepresent information about the product's
safety. "7
Another legislative option is mass immunization statutes. Mass immu-
nization laws protect those administering vaccines under broadscale immu-
nization programs. For example, a Maryland law protects persons
administering a drug or vaccine from liability when the administration is
part of a state approved immunization project. 74 Such statutes could be
170. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 169, at 220-22 (discussing state tort reform
provisions); Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 169, at 272-300 (same).
171. Darren O'Leary Aitken, Note, The Products Liability Provision of the Civil Liability
Reform Act of 1987: An Evaluation of Its Impact and Scope, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1449 (1989)
(discussing effect of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1991) on product liability law).
172. Aitken, supra note 171, at 1449.
173. Id. at 1449 n.4. The complete text of CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1991)
reads:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:
2(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community; and
2(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal consumption,
such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as identified in comment i
to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "product liability action" means any
action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not include
an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach or an express warranty.
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or amend existing
California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121 and
shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or commenced after, January
1, 1988.
Id.
174. The text of Maryland's mass immunization statute reads,
(a) Nonliability of persons administering.-person lawfully administering a drug or
vaccine shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-372 (b) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
(b) Immunization projects; nonliability of participants.-If the Secretary or a designee
of the Secretary finds that a proposed immunization project would conform to good
medical and public health practice and gives written approval for the project to be
administered in this State, a physician, nurse, or person participating in the project
shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-372 (c) of the Courts and
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expanded to cover the manufacturer of the FDA-approved vaccine. How-
ever, strong debate exists on whether an HIV vaccine will be used to
vaccinate the whole population or just high risk groups, thus such statutes
may be of limited the utility.
75
Clearly, states have been much more involved in the development of
AIDS legislation and policies than has the federal government. 76 While
these state resolutions are praiseworthy for their active role, AIDS presents
a national emergency that federal officials must deal with by national
policy.'" In June 1987, the National Conference of State Legislatures
adopted a broad policy requesting increased federal efforts to prevent the
spread of AIDS. 78 A national consensus, as opposed to individual treatment
by the states, will effectively provide the uniform treatment of manufacturers
required to solve the problem. 79 Yet at the close of the first decade of the
AIDS epidemic, the United States had neither a national AIDS policy nor
a coordinated strategy for combatting this public health threat.8 0
B. Possible Federal Legislation
There are three types of federal legislation that would encourage the
development and marketing of an AIDS vaccine: (1) federal Product liability
reform; (2) specific federal AIDS legislation; or (3) a national vaccine
Judicial Proceedings Article.
MD. HEALTi-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-401 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
175. MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note. 2, at 232-34 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of pre-exposure and postexposure vaccination). It remains unclear whether an
AIDS vaccine will be used to vaccinate the population in general and thus the utility of the
mass immunization statutes is uncertain. Id.
176. Taunya L. Banks, AIDS and Government: A Plan of Action?, 87 MIcH. L. RE,.
1321, 1333-34 (1989); see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing scope of state
and federal legislation dealing with AIDS epidemic).
177. See Rivas, supra note 18, at 110 (remarking this is not situation where each state
can be left to deal with issues individually); Harold L. Hirsh, AIDS Updated: A Review-
Part 1, 31 TRAUMA 85, 86 (1989) (arguing that because of enormity and complexity of AIDS
problem it is critical that United States develop realistic AIDS policy); Ars DRUGS: WHERE "
ARE THEY?, H.R. REP. No. 1092, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1988) [hereinafter AIDS DRUGS]
(noting national scope of crisis which necessitates federal response). During a crisis of the
national scope and proportions of the AIDS epidemic, the federal government necessarily must
become the primary policymaker and stimulus of action. Id. The Committee on Government
Operations found that "the Federal Government has not provided that leadership." Id. at 17.
The Committee recommended that the President declare AIDS a public health emergency and
direct all relevant federal agencies to create long-term action plans to accomplish the goal of
finding a cure. Id. at 33. Recently, Congress noted that given the growing dimensions of the
crisis and the limited resources available, it is imperative that a national policy be developed
jointly by the public and private sectors. H.R. REP. No. 511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1990).
Such a policy must seek, in a cost-effective way, to achieve fundamental national goals of
prevention, treatment, and cure. Id. A coherent national approach is needed, not piecemeal
solutions. Id.
178. Rivas, supra note 18, at 110 (citing State Legislators Endorse Massive Federal AIDS
Effort, AIDS POL'Y & L., Aug. 12, 1987, at 4).
179. QuAM & FORD, supra note 8, at 44-45. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying
text (describing necessity of federal solution).
180. QuAm & FORD, supra note 8, at 44.
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:559
compensation and immunization system."' Federal legislation in any of these
areas would remove the obstacles currently hindering the development and
marketing of potential AIDS vaccines.
1. Product Liability Reform
For over a decade, lobbyists have been hounding Congress to pass a
uniform product liability law. 82 Advocates of tort reform contend that
juries grant excessive punitive damage awards to consumers which go far
beyond fair compensation, 83 and that the patchwork of state laws discour-
ages new product development. 8 4 In 1990, the Senate Commerce Committee
approved a bill, the Product Liability Reform Act, designed to resolve some
of the manufacturers' liability problems. 8 ' The bill would establish federal
standards for product liability litigation and includes provisions that would
pre-empt conflicting state product liability law, establish incentives for out-
of-court settlements, place uniform time limitations on liability, and prohibit
punitive damages against manufacturers and sellers of drugs and medical
devices approved by the FDA. 86 The positive effect of the bill for phar-
maceutical companies would be two-fold. First, the pre-emption of state
tort law by uniform federal standards decreases the current uncertainty
surrounding a manufacturers' liability exposure and makes compliance with
standards possible.8 7 Second, the prohibition against punitive damages
181. See infra part V.B.I (discussing product liability reform); infra part V.B.2 (discussing
AIDS specific legislation); infra part V.B.3 (discussing national vaccine compensation system).
182. See Issue: Product Liability, 49 CoNG. Q. 2235, 2235 (1991) (special report) (stating
that "undaunted by more than a decade of congressional rebuffs on issue, manufacturers are
again pushing for federal legislation to limit collections for injuries caused by faulty products").
But see Russ M. Herman, Drug Industry Delusions, TiuLa, Dec. 1989, at 7 (arguing that
Product Liability Reform Act, Senate Bill S. 1400, and Product Liability Reform Act of 1989,
House Bill H.R. 2700, are anti-consumer legislation supported only by large manufacturers).
Herman states that such bills are the last step in insulating the drug industry from public and
legal accountability for its products. Id. He further argues that FDA approval is completely
inadequate to ensure consumers sufficient information on the drug and is tainted by political
and administrative difficulties. Id.
183. See Issue: Product Liability, supra note 182, at 2235 (noting that in March 1991
Supreme Court gave issue of tort reform and recovery limitations back to Congress and
individual states by holding that punitive damages are constitutional).
184. Section Notes, 49 CONG. Q. 2618, 2618 (1991).
185. Issue: Product Liability, supra note 182, at 2235. The Product Liability Reform Act
was the topic of long-lasting hearings before the subcommittee on the Consumer in Spring of
1990. See Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Product Liability Hearings].
186. Id. at 11-36 (giving full text of bill's punitive damage provision).
187. See id. at 592 (statement of National Governors Association). The Association argued
that differences in state liability laws have made it difficult for manufacturers to assess their
own risks and have increased the costs and the general uncertainty about the nature of risks
involved in product development. Id. The Association urged Congress to adopt a uniform
product liability code to decrease these rising product liability costs. Id. at 13-14 (statement
of George S. Frazza on behalf of Johnson & Johnson and the pharmaceutical industry). Frazza
argued that there is no single standard by which a pharmaceutical manufacturers' product is
judged and that ensuing damage awards are huge. Id. This climate of uncertainty causes higher
prices and fewer choices in the marketplace damaging the citizens of this country. Id. at 611.
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greatly reduces the cost of litigation for a pharmaceutical manufacturer."'
Interestingly, the punitive damage provision would cover only FDA-ap-
proved products, and thus is a codification of the common-law government
standards defense.8 9 Despite its popularity, the Product Liability Reform
Act never reached the Senate floor in 1990. Nevertheless, in early 1991 the
bill was reintroduced in both the Senate and the House. 190 What will become
of the renamed Product Liability Fairness Act during second session of
1991 Congress is still unclear. 191
Notably, there are strong political forces opposing a uniform product
liability law. The American Bar Association (ABA) clearly expressed its
dislike of federal product liability reform during the 1990 Senate hearings.192
The ABA finds state tort law both desirable and adequate, with the possible
exception of mass torts. 93 In the mass tort context, which would be
applicable to an AIDS vaccination scheme, the ABA favors a compensation
system, as opposed to uniform tort reform.194 The ABA's approach is
consistent with the National Commission on Vaccine's approach of a
compensation program for vaccine-related" injuries. 95 Consumer groups crit-
icize current product liability law proposals as anti-consumer legislation
supported only by large manufacturers who are attempting to insulate the
drug industry from public and legal accountability. 96
2. AIDS-Specific Legislation
In 1987 the Reagan administration appointed an independent public
advisory commission, the Presidential Commission on AIDS (Commission),
188. See id. at 610-14 (noting the cost of tort suits and arguing for prohibition of punitive
damages for FDA-approved drugs in tort actions).
189. Id. at 614 (statement of pharmaceutical industry in support of S.1400).
190. Issue: Product Liability, supra note 182, at 2235. House bill H.3030 was introduced
on July 25, 1991, by J. Roy Rowlan and was referred to the Energy, Commerce, and Judiciary,
and Energy house committees. Id. Senate bill S.640 was introduced March 13 by Bob Kasten
and was referred to the Commerce Consumer Subcommittee, which after hearings in mid-
september approved the bill. Id.
191. The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee approved the Product
Liability Fairness Act on October 3, 1991. See Current Status of Senate Bills (CCH) 20,502
(Oct. 18, 1991). The House hearings are expected this fall, under the support of committee
Chairman John D. Dingell, D-Mich. Issue: Product Liability, supra note 182, at 2235. But
even supporters for the bill are doubtful because the bill, now S.640, does not set a uniform
standard, as it does for products liability, for awarding punitive damages and thus even
supporters of the bill express concern that this version would address only part of the current
problem facing manufacturers. Id.
192. Product Liability Hearings, supra note 185, at 583 (statement of Robert B. McKay,
chairman, Action Commission to Improve Tort Liability System).
193. Id. at 584.
194. Id.
195. See infra part V.B.3.b (discussing National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).
196. Herman, supra note 182.
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to investigate the epidemic and recommend policies and practices for the
federal government. 197 More specifically, the President asked the Commission
to recommend measures that he and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services could take to protect the public from contracting HIV, to assist in
finding a cure for AIDS, and to care for those who already have the
disease. 9 A year later the Commission published a final report that was
praised by many as "a blueprint for action that was scientifically sound,
politically sensitive, and far-reaching in its critique of current efforts and
calls for major reforms."' 99 The report pointed out the necessity for liability
protection for manufacturers who are attempting to develop an AIDS
vaccine.200 The National Commission on AIDS 20' continues the President's
Commission program, but government officials have yet to take any action
on the recommendation to develop liability protection. 202 One commentator
notes that once again the federal health establishment is acting as a "many-
headed bureaucratic system with no one in effective control. '20 3
3. A National Vaccine Compensation System
While there appears to be no legislation planned for the immediate
future, Congress has indicated interest in the subject and various senators
have requested committees and outside institutions to develop proposals.
The proposals for an AIDS vaccine liability bill include a novel scheme
called the Keystone Center AIDS Vaccine Liability Project2 , and a scheme
197. Exec. Order No. 12,601, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (1987) (reports by Committee include:
preliminary report-12/2/87; interim report-3/15/88; final report-6/24/88). The President asked
the Commission to advise government officials on the medical, legal, ethical, social, and
economic impact resulting from the spread of HIV. AIDS DRucs, supra note 177, atI8 (citing
Exec. Order No. 12,601); Kristine M. Gebbie, The President's Commission on AIDS: What
Did it Do?, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALrH 868, 868 (citing Presidential Commission, The Final
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 47
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, June 1988, which lists examination of policies
for development of drugs as one of Commission's. main goals).
198. See id. For a detailed overview of the Presidential Commissions on AIDS goals,
recommendations, and accomplishments, see Banks, supra note 176.
199. Qu m & FoRD, supra note 8, at 44. See also Gebbie, supra note 197, at 868
(explaining what President's Commission did and did not accomplish).
200. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
THE HuMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 47 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing
Office, June 1988).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 300cc (1991).
202. See Gebbie, supra note 197, at 868-70 (discussing Commission's mandate, accom-
plishments, and short-comings). In 1988, Congress passed S. 1220 declaring AIDS a national
emergency and authorizing funds for research and public information efforts, but aside from
this legislation, Congress has not formulated a policy beyond the scope of appropriation.
AIDS Page, FDA CONsUMsER, Feb. 1989, at 2.
203. QuAm & FORD, supra note 8, at 29.
204. Keystone Center, Keystone AIDS Vaccine Liability Project Final Report (May 1990),
reprinted in AIDS REFERENCE GUImE 1321 (1990) [hereinafter Keystone Proposal] (study &
proposal by non-profit group at request of Rep. John Dingell, chair of House Energy &
Commerce Committee, for information contact Robert Stein of Blicker, Futterman & Stein,
D.C.).
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modeled after previously implemented state and federal schemes, such as
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,205 the California Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Vaccine Statute, 201 and the National
Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976.20
a. The Keystone Center AIDS Vaccine Liability Report
In 1990 a congressionally delegated group of individuals drafted the
Keystone Center Proposal as a compensation system for clinical trials.
2°
The scheme focuses on liability for injuries occurring in clinical trials of
AIDS vaccines as opposed to general vaccination. 209 While the proposal is
not designed to address a manufacturers' liability for FDA-approved or
marketed vaccine injuries, some of the proposal's systems and attributes
are transferrable to legislation that would protect manufacturers once a
vaccine reaches the mass immunization context.
The Keystone proposal provides an exclusive administrative remedy for
injury resulting from vaccination. 21 0 The basic structure of the system
consists of: (1) A thorough prevaccination informed consent process;21' (2)
a hearing of any injury claims before a small expert panel who will determine
causation and degree of disability;212 (3) a determination as to the compen-
sation levels depending on type and extent of injury,2 3 and; (4) a limited
appeal provision.
214
The group rejected a common-pool fund approach to compensation
because it was concerned that if manufacturers were made responsible for
205. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -33 (1991).
206. CAL. HEALTH & SAF=T CODE §§ 199.45-.57 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(1) (1991).
208. Keystone Proposal, supra note 204, at 1.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1, 5. There is an exception to the "exclusive" remedy for injury resulting
from "unacceptable behavior" for which a tort remedy is still available. Id. at 5. The
"unacceptable behavior" standard was set at a level to ensure preservation of the "deterrent
effect of the existing tort system" on manufacturers in the new system. Id. Unacceptable
behavior would include an "intentional violation of the law, conscious disregard for the rights
or safety of others, or intentional conduct that was designed to deceive or conceal; and which
was casually related to the injury in question." Id.
211. Id. at 2-4.
212. Id. at 4-5. The panel would be solely scientific experts in AIDS because of the causal
relation problems inherent in vaccine injury cases, especially with a disease as new a AIDS.
Id. Even more interestingly, the causation standard employed would give the benefit of the
doubt to the claimant. Id. at 6.
213. Id. at 6. The proposal provided for payment of unreimbursed medical expenses, but
was inconclusives as to allowances for economic losses and pain and suffering awards. Id. at
9. A lump sum was favored over periodic payments, and would consist of medical expenses,
but the group did not reach consensus on coverage for other economic losses, or pain &
suffering. Id. at 6-7. However, the Keystone group did note that the Childhood Vaccine
Scheme has a cap of 250,000 economic losses and the California scheme provides up to
$250,000 for pain & suffering. Id. at 7-8.
214. See id. at 6 (providing provision for administrative appeal and limited formal judicial
review).
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injuries caused by a competitors product vaccine development would be
discouraged. 215 Instead, the group suggested a system in which each manu-
facturer is responsible for its own vaccinees up to a set amount, with a
federal trust fund to pay awards exceeding that maximum. 216 There has
been little commentary on the proposal, and the drafters recognize that the
effectiveness of the system depends on many factors that can not be
predicted until actual utilization of the scheme.
217
b. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (Act) of 1986 established
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to compensate indivi-
duals for injuries or death related to the childhood vaccines. 2 8 The program
is the first federal no-fault system for handling claims arising from injuries
caused by vaccines and could be used as a prototype for handling claims
related to AIDS vaccines.2 9 The compensation is less generous than that
available in a tort action, but the low burden of proof and speed of award
make the process attractive.220 Petitions are filed within a specified time
with the United States Court of Claims.?2' A Special Master makes the
initial findings of fact and conclusion of law, which are then reviewed by
the Claims Court.m2 To succeed, an injured party must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury was one listed on the Vaccine
Injury Table, that the first symptoms of injury occurred within the time
period specified on the table, and that factors unrelated to vaccine admin-
istrations did not cause the injury.22 A party is free to appeal the judgement
to the United States Court of Appeals.224
215. See id. at 8 (noting disadvantage of California's compensation system because funding
mechanism consists of surcharge on manufacturers in common pooled format).
216. Id. at 8-9.
217. Id. at 9. The Keystone group noted that,
"Whether such a trade-off between manufacturers and injured volunteers] will
reduce the likelihood of inappropriate deterrence to AIDS vaccine research will
depend upon the risks perceived by vaccine developers as clinical trials approach,
the levels of the proposed caps on awards, practical approaches to ensuring that
insolvency and actual bankruptcies of small companies will not prevent the availability
of funds for claims, and the exact extent of the role to be played by tort suits in
the context of a claims program."
Id.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -33 (1991). The law aims at funnelling lawsuits out of the
overburdened court system and into a simpler, federally funded compensation program, thereby
lowering manufacturers' insurance costs and preserving vaccine supplies. Sarah Glazer, Vaccine
Victims: No-Fault Federal Program Compensates for Injuries, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1991, at
9.
219. Glazer, supra note 218, at 9.
220. Cooper, supra note 6, at 18.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (1991).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1991). See Huber, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that this system
can result in the district judge "doing the whole thing over again").
223. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13 (1991); Hagan, supra note 3, at 481.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12, -32 (1991) (within 60 days).
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The Act partially immunizes a vaccine manufacturer from civil liabil-
ity.?2 A manufacturer is not liable if the injury results from side-effects
which were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and
accompanied by proper directions and warnings-this is, a codification of
the Restatement's comment k exception. " 6 Most importantly, warnings that
comply with FDA requirements are presumed to be adequate, unless the
plaintiff can show fraud or intentional with-holding of information from
the FDA during pre and post approval of the vaccine. 227 Furthermore,
manufacturers are not liable for failure to provide direct warnings to the
vaccinee of the potential dangers.m The Act also allows for civil liability
where a plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the manufac-
turer failed to exercise due care-a negligence-like standard.229 In cases
where civil liability is found a manufacturer is not generally subject to
punitive damages. 20
Compensation comes from a pool funded by revenues from a tax on
vaccine sales.?' Individuals filing for claims under the Act can receive
expenses for medical care, rehabilitation, emotional therapy, residential and
custodial care, and loss of earning capacity. 232 Compensation for pain and
suffering is capped at $250,000.23 The Act also requires parents to read
and sign a long, complicated consent form regarding the frequency and
severity of potential risks before vaccination of the child.234
Disadvantages to this approach include the likelihood that funding of
the compensation pool from a tax on the manufacturers will cause the
companies to pass the cost on to consumers in the price of the vaccine.
23 5
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) (1991) (limiting vaccine manufacturers' liability for
unavoidable side effects in product liability actions).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (1991).
227. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-22(b)(2) (1991).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c) (1991); Hagan, supra note 3, at 483; Huber, supra note 1,
at 10. The duty to warn provision in effect overrules the contrary holdings in Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) and Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). Hagan, supra at 483. In other
words, does away with the mass immunization exception limiting the application of the learned
intermediary doctrine in the general immunization context. See supra notes 123-26 and
accompanying text (discussing mass immunization exception).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(2)(B) (1991).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23(d) (1991); Hagan, supra note 3, at 483; Huber, supra note 1,
at 10.
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132 (Supp. 1988); Hagan, supra note 3, at 482. Compensation
for vaccine administration prior to Oct. 1, 1988 will come from congressional appropriations.
Id. at 482 n.33.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (1991). Compensation comes in a lump sum for injuries related
to vaccination after Oct. 1, 1988. Hagan, supra note 3, at 482.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (1991); Snider, supra note 1, at 23. Individuals injured
before Oct. 1, 1988 are eligible for less than this, and $250,000 is awarded in the case of
death. Id.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26 (1991).
235. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 768-70 (discussing potential problems with National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act).
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Unfortunately the exorbitant price of AIDS treatments already has been a
notable problem. 216 The biggest gap in the legislation is that an individual
is free under the Act to give up the alternative compensation and pursue a
traditional tort action if dissatisfied with the compensation determined under
the statutorily created proceeding. 237 Yet, as of January 1991, the Court of
Claims reports that no one has declined an award.23s
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act has been in effect for
almost seven years and by most measures, the program is a success. 2 9
Lawsuits against DPT manufacturers declined from their 1986 peak of 255
to 47 in 1990, vaccine prices have stabilized, and worries over supply have
subsided. 240 As of May 21, 1990, 296 vaccine-related injury claims were
filed.24' The sixty-nine awards granted up to May 1990 totaled thirty-seven
million dollars.2A2 But the program has caused concern since the fall of
1990, when more than 3,000 new claims were filed. 243 Assuming half of
these are meritable, the program will not have enough money to compensate
all the injured vacinees. 2 4 By January 1991, the total figure for awards
paid out has already jumped to seventy-four million dollars. 24 The chairman
of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines has remarked, "This
is going to be ... something Congress will have a tough time wrestling
with.,,1246
c. The National Swine Flu Program
Another past federal program that could serve as a model for AIDS
vaccine liability reform is the National Swine Flu Program?47 During federal
236. See Chase, supra note 24, at Al (discussing patients dissatisfaction with prices of
current AIDS drug therapies).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1991). See Hagan, supra note 3, at 482 (noting that after
judgement awarding or denying compensation in statutorily created proceeding, petitioner has
90 days to accept judgement or file civil action for damages); Huber, supra note 1, at 10
(noting injured plaintiff is free to reject findings and file action against manufacturer in state
court under slightly restricted tort theory).
238. Glazer, supra note 218, at 9.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Snider, supra note 1, at 23. Of the 296 vaccine-related claims under the National
Childhood Vaccine Program, 194 were for injuries and 102 were for deaths. Id.
242. Id. Nineteen of the 296 claims have been either dismissed or voluntarily withdrawn.
Id.
243. Glazer, supra note 218, at 9.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. The newpaper article on the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act suggests solutions to
the financing problems such as a cap on awards or restricting the kinds of injuries for which
awards may be granted. Id. Although there are caps on certain categories of expenses the
current law puts no limit on the overall injury award amount. Id. Awards for the pre-1988
injuries averaged about 1.2 million dollars, according to Human Health Services. According
to Claims Court Chief Special Master, the program has paid out 74 million dollars in 145
cases thus far. Id.
247. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 380, 90 Stat. 1113
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efforts to prevent a possible swine flu pandemic in 1976, the federal
government indemnified swine flu vaccine manufacturers from product
liability by enacting the National Swine Flu Immunization Program.248 This
legislation barred suits for injuries or death allegedly caused by the swine
flu vaccine against those who manufactured, distributed, or administered
it. 9 This vaccine immunity act is entirely different from all others in tiat
the exclusive remedy for an injured party is a suit against the United States.
Thus, the government assumed liability for any action based on strict
liability, negligence, or breach of warranty.2 0 If recovery was ultimately
obtained under a negligence theory, the government was free to recover
from the manufacturer the amount paid out to the injured party. 21
While such a structure certainly removes most of a manufacturers'
liability worries, it is too lax. The manufacturer does not even have a duty
to warn under such legislation. 2 2 Rather, in the swine flu context the
government prepared a consent form that attempted to provide adequate
warning about the possible adverse effects from swine flu immunization. 2 3
This system proved disastrous for the government because of the unavoidable
delays when incorporating the manufacturers' new risk information into the
government's consent form.2 4 The system also resulted in a lack of incentive
for the manufacturers to continue monitoring risks. 255 Only two months
after the immunizations began they were abruptly discontinued due to a
large number of cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome, a paralytic condition,
resulting from the immunization .2 6 The government's consent form did not
include the risk of contracting the syndrome and, thus, the government was
left with a number of extremely disfavorable lawsuits. 257 As of January
1989, the government had received 4179 claims and 1604 lawsuits alleging
injury from the vaccine. The government has settled 1100 of these suits at
a cost of about 79 million dollars, and judgements for plaintiffs in 105
lawsuits resulted in a- cost of about 45 million dollars. 258 The government
(1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-I (1991)). See Cooper, supra note 6, at 19
(stating "the only legislation.. .[which] would satisfy [AIDS] manufacturer or its insurers" is
one modeled after the swine-flu legislation).
248. AsHBuRy, supra note 2, at 69.
249. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 380, § 4(i)(2)(A),
90 Stat. 1113, 1115 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-I (1991)); Hagan, supra
note 3, at 478.
250. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 380, § 4(i)(2)(A),
90 Stat. 1113, 1115 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247ba)-1 (1991)); See AsHmuRy,
supra note 2, at 69 (noting federal government indemnified swine flu vaccine manufacturers
from product liability suits).
251. AsBuRY, supra note 2, at 72.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 72-73.
254. Hagan, supra note 3, at 479.
255. Id.
256. Hagan, supra note 3, at 478; AsHnuRY, supra note 2, at 73.
257. Hagan, supra note 3, at 478.
258. Id.
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has not sought reimbursement from any manufacturer that participated in
the program. 219 It is unlikely that the federal government will ever open
itself up to such enormous liability costs again.
260
4. Proposal for a Federal Compensation and Immunization System
In summary, support clearly exists for the federal government to alter
an AIDS vaccine manufacturers' liability under traditional tort theory, either
by enactment of a national product liability statute or by exempting man-
ufacturers from product liability suits and creating a compensation scheme
for injured vaccinees. 261 General Product liability reform is a massive un-
dertaking with strong opposition from both the ABA and consumer groups.2
The AIDS vaccine liability problem must be addressed immediately and
specifically. 263 Thus, general tort reform is an inadequate solution. The best
option is to create a federal compensation and immunization statute specif-
ically tailored to the AIDS situation. The Institute of Medicine Committee
on Public-Private Sector Relations in Vaccine Innovation's findings lend
support to this solution.26 In 1985 the Committee concluded that the
common-law tort system is not able to provide predictable, rapid, and
equitable compensation for vaccine-related injuries because each claim re-
quires an extended, costly, and complex adjudication procedure that results
in unpredictable outcomes.2 61 It recommended a compensation approach
that would attempt to balance the need to compensate the rare injured
victim and the public health goal of preventing the spread of harmful disease
through vaccination. 26 These recommendations led to the enactment of the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 designed to address the
problem tort liability was causing childhood vaccine manufacturers. 267 The
National Childhood Vaccine Act has been quite successful, both in com-
pensating injured vaccinees quickly and inexpensively and in removing the
liability worries that inhibit vaccine innovation, raise prices, and remove
259. Hagan, supra note 3, at 479.
260. See AsHBuRy, supra note 2, at 74 (noting that government will probably not fashion
any future vaccine libility system on swine flu scenario).
261. See ABA COORDINATiNG CommITEE, supra note 24, at 147 (citing R. NEUSTADT AND
H. FiNEBERG, THE SwrNE FLU AFFAIR (1987)) (discussing history of federal assumptions of
liability when insurance carriers would not or could not accept risks for vaccine). Government
programs to indemnify manufacturers of HIV vaccines may be developed in the event that
obtaining liability insurance is a problem for future products. Id. at 147 (citing National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).
262. See supra notes 182-196 and accompanying text (discussing product liability reform
efforts).
263. See infra note 279 and accompanying text (noting pressing need for AIDS vaccine).
264. VSI, supra note 2, at v.
265. Id. at 155.
266. Id. at 1-13 (summarizing Committee findings and models for possible vaccine-related
injury compensation and liability systems).
267. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33 (1991).
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existing products from the market. 268 The inadequacy of the product liability
system at handling the childhood vaccines is analogous to the AIDS vaccine
situation, and thus, one expects similar success with an AIDS vaccine
compensation scheme.
Yet, an AIDS vaccine compensation and immunization system should
not be identical to the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Rather, it should
consist of a compilation of effective features from each of the previously
discussed models. An appropriate statute would include: Almost complete
immunity from traditional product liability suits, a scientific administrative
body to determine causation and degree of disability, a capped compensation
fund financed by a vaccine tax with a government backup provision, and
limited judicial review.
The high level of protection from liability available under an "unac-
ceptable behavior standard," such as in the Keystone proposal, 269 provides
better protection for the manufacturer than an "unavoidable side-effect"
standard, as in the Childhood Vaccine Act, because it requires an injured
vaccinee to meet much higher burden before a tort cause of action becomes
available. A high standard satisfactorily quenches a manufacturers' litigation
fears while leaving intact the deterrent effect of tort liability on negligent
or malicious behavior by manufacturers. 2 0 An expert body is needed to
hear the injury cases because the novelty and complexity of AIDS requires
special causation considerations to make sure the injuries complained of
result from vaccination and not one of the numerous conditions or side-
diseases characteristic of the Syndrome itself.27' A common-pool compen-
sation fund is a better choice than Keystone's self-insuring model because
it is not as complicated as a self-insuring fund. A self-insuring fund requires
a bond-like deposit every time an individual is vaccinated-placing a huge
burden on a manufacturer. 272 Thus, the manufacturer is responsible for the
total money award to an individual suffering side-effects from its vaccine.
273
268. See supra notes 239-246 and accompanying text (discussing success of Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act).
269. See Keystone Proposal, supra note 204, at 5-6 (discussing unacceptable behavior
standard). The Keystone group explained that the "unacceptable behavior" standard could be
met by "behavior which was an intentional violation of the law, conscious disregard for the
rights ot safety of others, or intentional conduct which was designed to deceive or conceal
[the risks]." Id. at 5.
270. See id. (noting that it is important to preserve deterrent effect of existing tort system
in any new system that is developed); supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting that
leaving vaccinee option of rejecting compensation fund monies and resorting to tort litigation
may be problematic and does not assure manufacturers much protection); supra note 159
(noting that under California statutory scheme plaintiffs are allowed option of tort lawsuits,
thus, manufacturers are in no way assured vaccine-injured individuals will resort to compen-
sation fund).
271. See Keystone Proposal, supra note 204, at 4, 6 (discussing causation burden in
Keystone proposal); supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting advantage of low causation
connection in childhood vaccine injury cases).
272. Keystone Proposal, supra note 204, at 8.
273. Id.
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The common-pool approach requires a surcharge on each vaccine unit
distributed, which then goes into a general fund. 2 4 The surcharge system
proportionalizes the amount paid into the fund with the units of vaccine
administered; A government back-up fund is necessary to prevent fund
financing problems which may occur at the start of the fund and in times
of increased injuries. 2" Compensation for the injured vaccinee should be
limited to unreimbursed medical expenses, capped economic losses, and
capped pain and suffering. 276 The compensation award should not include
punitive damages.2 7 Additionafly, manufacturers should be required to
coordinate with vaccine administrators in planning a thorough informed
consent process. The consent process would inform potential vaccinees on
an individual basis of the known benefits and risks and the array of
unknowns surrounding the new AIDS vaccine. 278
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to stop the AIDS epidemic before it reaches catastrophic
proportions a vaccine against the HIV infection must be available for
manufacturing no later than the mid-1990s. 2 9 The existence of liability for
adverse side-effects under traditional tort theory, even with built-in excep-
tions in the pharmaceutical context, is hindering both the development and
production of potential vaccines. An alternative approach to handle the
dual goal of compensation of injured plaintiffs and regulation of manufac-
turers' safety considerations is needed in order to promote vaccine devel-
opment, production, and access. Carefully structured federal legislation
limiting immunity for AIDS-vaccine manufacturers and creating a compen-
sation fund can accomplish this goal.
Kellen F. Cloney
274. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (discussing California statute's com-
mon-pool compensation fund).
275. See supra note 158 (explaining problem surcharge funding mechanism may create
during start-up of fund); supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text (explaining current fear
that overwhelming increase in petitions will drain fund and suggesting possible solutions of
capping awards or using other government funds).
276. See Keystone Proposal, supra note 204, at 7-8 (discussing losses to be compensated
by AIDS vaccine compensation and immunization system).
277. See id. at 8 (noting that in nonfault-based system punitive damages should not be
awarded); supra note 188-89 and accompanying text (explaining why product liability reform
bills prohibit punitive damages).
278. See id. at 2-4 (explaining necessity of thorough informed consent and describing
possible methods).
279. JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 21, at 6.
